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BENJAMIN GRAY
A Civic Alternative to Stoicism: The Ethics
of Hellenistic Honorary Decrees
This article shows how the public inscriptions of Hellenistic poleis, especially decrees in honor
of leading citizens, illuminate Greek ethical thinking, including wider debates about questions of
central importance for Greek ethical philosophers. It does so by comparing decrees’ rhetoric with
the ethical language and doctrines of different ancient philosophical schools. Whereas some
scholars identify ethical views comparable to Stoic ideas in Hellenistic decrees, this article argues
that there are more significant overlaps, especially in decrees from Asia Minor dating to after
150 BC, with fourth-century BC ethical philosophy, especially Aristotle’s, and its Hellenistic conti-
nuators. The overlaps between decrees and philosophers’ approaches had complex, diverse causes
(section 4), probably sometimes including philosophical education and influence. Comparison of
philosophy and epigraphy shows that, in the same way as the polis continued to flourish after
Chaironeia, critical reflection about the ethical foundations of civic life also remained vibrant, among
both philosophers and citizens.
1. INTRODUCTION
In 76 BC, Iatrokles, a citizen of the polis of Mylasa in Caria, was praised in an
honorary decree passed by the Mylasan civic sub-division of the Otorkondeis for
releasing poor citizens from loan contracts, “thinking that justice is more profitable
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than injustice” (λυσιτελεστέραν ἡγούμενος τὴν δικαιοσύ[νην] τῆς ἀδικίας).1 This
claim is striking for its abstract character: the decree describes, not only
Iatrokles’ behavior, but also the ethical attitude that underpinned it. The claim is
also striking because it represents almost a quotation of words of Socrates in
Plato’s Republic: towards the end of Book I, Socrates claims that he has refuted
Thrasymachos, by showing that “injustice is never more beneficial than justice”
(οὐδέποτε . . . λυσιτελέστερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης).2 Moreover, the comment
evokes the principal thesis of the Republic as a whole: the life of justice will
always be more beneficial than the life of injustice, even if the just person encoun-
ters the worst deprivations and torment.
This article argues that this is not an isolated example. Almost all inscribed
Hellenistic honorary decrees appeal to abstract concepts, such as virtue and justice.
Some historians interested principally in political narrative and institutions or social
history have seen this as a severe obstacle to historical investigation.3 This skeptical
approach underestimates the role of abstract honorific language itself in mediating
power relations,4 as well as in expressing collective attempts at mutual understand-
ing and at grasping the ethical world. Honorific rhetoric offers vivid insights into
Hellenistic ethics, culture, and politics.
Indeed, this article argues that many honorary decrees, especially the longer, more
elaborate ones which become more frequent after c. 150 BC,5 must be taken seriously
as complex ethical texts: as documents presupposing, or expressing, sophisticated
ideas about the good man, the good citizen, and the good polis. Because they had to
be widely accessible and intelligible, decrees inevitably lacked the argumentative style
of ancient philosophical works on ethics. Nevertheless, in praising leading citizens,
decree-drafters often set out almost utopian notions of good citizen conduct, para-
digms to stimulate emulation and to advertise the quality of local civic life to posterity.
The method used to analyze the ethical language of decrees is to compare their
ethical language and ideas with those of ancient philosophical schools. It must be
emphasized that many of the ideas discussed are very widely attested in Greek liter-
ature and culture: philosophers rarely had a monopoly on any given line of thinking.
1. I.Mylasa 109, ll. 8–10.
2. Pl. Rep. 354a8–9; cf. 354b7; 360c8.
3. See Habicht 1995: 88; compare Thonemann 2011: 204–205, 241, on the need to emerge from
the “trap” or “cave” of honorific rhetoric, which conceals the truth of inequalities of power and wealth.
There has not so far been a decisive concerted reaction among scholars against the traditional
approach to decrees’ ethical content advocated by M. Holleaux, who severely criticized the second-
century BC drafter of a decree of Cretan auxiliaries on Delos for Aglaos of Cos for having mastered
“l’art d’écrire pour ne rien dire”: the decree contains “cette langue prolixe et diluée, veule et vague,
toute en formules abstraites, qui était chère aux lettres de l’époque,” such that “presque aucun fait
précis n’émerge de cette verbosité molle et fluente” (Holleaux 1913: 9–23, quotation p. 18).
Contrast the identification of a distinctive ethical position in this decree at the end of section 3d below.
4. Ma (2002: 193–94) accepts that the language of the Aglaos decree (previous note) is platitu-
dinous, but finds it nonetheless interesting as the currency of power and political communication
(compare Veyne 1976: 239).
5. Compare, for example, Robert 1960a: 325. Shorter, less rhetorical honorary decrees certainly
also survived: compare Habicht 1995: 89.
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There is much scope for further research, to which I hope to contribute, which will
compare the ideology of inscribed decrees with those of a whole range of other
genres, including rhetoric, historiography, biography, and drama.
Nonetheless, the project attempted in this article—comparison of decrees with
philosophy in particular—offers a distinctive perspective on decrees’ ideology,
regardless of whether there were any direct connections between ancient philo-
sophical works and decrees. Comparison with ancient philosophy makes it possi-
ble, first, to classify the ethical ideas of a decree with conceptual precision but
the lowest possible risk of anachronism. Second, comparison with self-consciously
sophisticated and abstract ancient philosophical works is particularly useful for
estimating the precise register of inscribed rhetoric, and the nature and level of
its intellectual content and intellectual pretensions; it helps, for example, to distin-
guish trends in earlier and later Hellenistic decrees (sections 2 and 3 below).
Third, comparison with ancient philosophy brings into particularly sharp focus
the discursive context within which decree-drafters wrote. In this respect, the method
applied here is something like an inversion of the method of interpreting texts of
political philosophy pioneered by Pocock and Skinner.6 Those scholars use intellec-
tual and non-intellectual texts from the same period to help reconstruct the broader
debates and controversies to which an author of a prominent work of political
philosophy was responding, in order to bring out that author’s rhetorical or polemical
intentions. In this article, conversely, the ideas of high philosophers are used to add
definition to the complex strands of mainstream Greek ethical thinking. This is pos-
sible because, as products of their time and place, Greek philosophers necessarily
engaged with different lines of mainstream thinking, even if they reacted forcefully
against some or all of them; in doing so, they often brought to the surface the fun-
damental issues and fault lines at stake even in non-philosophical discourse, where
they were more diffuse or submerged. Decrees’ ethical claims can be understood dif-
ferently against this background: comparison with ancient philosophers’ sharply
defined ideas and rhetoric makes it possible to identify what is distinctive, pointed
or even polemical in the ethical rhetoric of a decree, even if it initially seems bland
to a modern reader.
In the particular case addressed here, the controversies between the new
Hellenistic schools, especially the Stoics, and adherents of the fourth-century BC
schools, especially the Peripatetics, sharply expose some of the main underlying
fault lines of Greek ethics from the later fourth century onwards. They crystallize
tensions concerning, for example, the relationship between reason and emotion
(see section 3a below) or the standing of the individual vis-à-vis other people,
material wealth, and the wider world (see sections 3c-d below). Perhaps most
clearly, they throw into relief wider tensions between more individualistic, cosmo-
politan approaches and more civic, community-oriented ones (compare section 3e
below). Consideration of that philosophical background thus provides a very
6. See, for example, Pocock 1972; Skinner 1969 and 1988: 232–88.
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useful framework for assessing how inscribed decrees engage with live ethical
problems and disputes.
The widespread modern picture of Hellenistic philosophy and wider ethical
thought as dominated by the Stoics and other new schools and the assumptions
they developed, still influential among Hellenistic historians,7 has led most pre-
vious studies of decrees’ ethics to emphasize convergences with the Hellenistic
schools, especially Stoicism. Moretti argues that many decrees’ language of ener-
getic, unflinching civic euergetism derived partly from Stoic philosophy.8
Echoing Moretti, Wörrle comments on the value placed on exertion by citizens
in many later Hellenistic decrees, which he sees as an expression of “popularized
Stoic ethics.”9 More recently, Dreyer has seen later Hellenistic decrees’ frequent
interest in the virtuous lifestyles of civic benefactors as closely connected with
the practical ethical teachings of the Middle Stoa of Panaetius and Posidonius.10
The similarities which these scholars identify between the ethics of certain
decrees and those of Stoic philosophers are highly generic. The shortage of
well-preserved complete Hellenistic Stoic works is a partial obstacle to testing
for more specific overlaps, though the work of scholars of Hellenistic philosophy
on reconstructing Hellenistic Stoic terminology and arguments11 offers ample
material for comparison. Relying on this evidence, this article will show that
the ethical language and ideas that feature in Hellenistic honorary decrees over-
lap only slightly with Stoic ones, while often converging strongly with rival
intellectuals’ ideals.
Indeed, the decree for Iatrokles is unexceptional in converging strongly with
a major fourth-century BC ethical work. As Louis Robert pointed out, calling for
further research,12 many Hellenistic—and especially later Hellenistic—honorary
decrees gave prominence in their picture of the good citizen to ethical language
and ideas convergent with mainstream fourth-century philosophy, rhetoric, and
related thought. There is much further scope for future study of decrees’ overlaps
with other fourth-century literature and thought, but I focus here on many
decrees’ particularly interesting and important overlaps with Aristotle’s ethical
philosophy, in content and sensibility. Many relevant decrees also chime with
the ideas of many of Aristotle’s Hellenistic Peripatetic successors, whose rich
philosophical contributions have been made more accessible by a series of recent
studies.13
7. Consider recently Thonemann 2016: 87–88.
8. Moretti 1977: 85–86, recently discussed by Wiemer 2016: 24n.100, 27, who posits some
other convergences between decrees and Stoic ethics.
9. Wörrle 1995: 246.
10. Dreyer 2010: 352–53, 364.
11. See the fragments collected in Long and Sedley 1987: chs. 26–67. For overviews of the Stoic
approach to ethics that can be reconstructed from this evidence: Inwood and Donini 1999; Schofield
2003.
12. Robert 1960b: 213; 1967: 12n.1.
13. See (for example) Hahm 2007; Sharples 2010; Inwood 2014; Fortenbaugh 2018.
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It has now become almost a new orthodoxy that, far from dying at Chaironeia,
the traditional Greek polis flourished in the Hellenistic period.14 This article adds a
major new dimension to that picture. An established, idealistic, polis-centered eth-
ical code dominated public rhetoric throughout the Hellenistic period. Moreover, in
the period after c. 150 BC, changing social and political conditions led a signifi-
cant number of Hellenistic citizens to offer in their public rhetoric a relatively
sophisticated articulation of that code: an articulation resembling that of Aristotle
and the Peripatetics, its most thorough and explicit surviving philosophical spokes-
men. Even if some Hellenistic political thinkers turned away from the polis, civic
ideals still had many eloquent and thoughtful defenders.
In section 2, I show how the pervasive institution of the honorary decree for a
leading citizen, which came to prominence in Athens and other poleis in the second
half of the fourth century BC,15 embodied some specific fourth-century ideals, espe-
cially Aristotelian ones. Section 3 then goes on to demonstrate and analyze the emer-
gence after c. 150 BC of more developed, precise articulations in decrees of ideas
strongly convergent with fourth-century ethical thought and its Hellenistic continua-
tors. Until the end of section 3, the article remains neutral in most cases concerning
the question whether the overlaps between Hellenistic decrees and fourth-century
philosophical ethics are a result of any form of philosophical influence on relevant
decrees. Section 4 addresses this additional question, arguing that various processes
were probably at work, including exchange between Peripatetics and active citizens
as co-defenders of the civic ideal.
2. THE HELLENISTIC HONORARY DECREE AS AN INSTITUTION
EMBODYING ARISTOTELIAN IDEALS
Common Greek ethical and political assumptions, richly attested in earlier peri-
ods, dominate the typical content of a Hellenistic honorary decree for a home citizen:
decrees demonstrate the conservatism, geographical consistency, and often very
generic character of “Greek popular morality.”16 Aristotle and the Peripatetics shared
and developed many of these assumptions, but they were by no means uniquely
Aristotelian.
Particular actions are almost always mentioned or catalogued in decrees, some-
times in considerable detail,17 but they are usually presented as evidence for honor-
ands’ long-term dispositions (for example, ἀρετή, “virtue”; εὔνοια, “good will”; and
φιλοτιμία, “love of honor”).18 Typically, a description of past services builds up to
14. To cite a few examples from many, see Gauthier 1985; Ma 2002; Bencivenni 2003: 1–4 (all
building on the approaches to the Hellenistic period of A. Momigliano and L. Robert).
15. See Rosen 1987; Liddel 2007: 161.
16. For this notion: Dover 1974.
17. See Rosen 1987: 282–85.
18. Quaß (1993: 32, 49–50) suggests that these were traditional aristocratic concepts adopted and
adapted by poleis.
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the decreeing of honors, “for the sake of virtue” (ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα).19 This tendency of
decrees is consistent with the shared assumption of most ancient philosophers that
the focus of ethical assessment and education should be, not individual actions or
dilemmas, but agents’ long-term dispositions, especially states of virtue (ἀρετή)
and vice.20
Although Hellenistic decrees almost invariably praise virtue, there is little sign
of anything reminiscent of sophisticated philosophical examinations of the criteria
for judging an act or state virtuous, such as Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean.21 As
opposed to such specific doctrines, Hellenistic honorary decrees usually presuppose
commonsensical ideas about virtue widely attested in Greek texts from all periods
of antiquity. These are strongly consistent with Aristotle’s approach to virtue in his
Rhetoric, a work in which he sought to capture popular views without substantial
modification, in order to provide material for effective persuasion of real audiences.22
Decrees inevitably give the polis a central place as the arena for virtue.23 Some
honorific formulae attribute to honorands, as evidence for their praiseworthy civic dis-
positions, relatively undemanding behavior and habits, such as scrupulous adherence
to the law,24 preservation of trust as a magistrate,25 accurate accounting,26 or a ten-
dency to refuse bribes.27 However, the typical rhetoric and formulae of Hellenistic
decrees also emphasize that virtuous honorands act for the good of others, often
self-sacrificingly and supererogatively: they show good will (εὔνοια) and “enthusi-
asm” (προθυμία or σπουδή) to the community and individual citizens28 and do as
much good as possible for their polis,29 sometimes using or sacrificing their own pri-
vate financial resources30 or risking their own safety.31 This tallies with Aristotle’s
Rhetoric: indeed, Aristotle there inevitably concentrates on civic values and activities,
19. E.g., I.Priene2 19, ll. 5–31.
20. See, for example, Arist. EN 1105a17–1106a13. Compare Rosen 1987: 279; Ma 2002:
189–90.
21. Μετριότης is, however, occasionally praised: SEG 37.1006 (Adramyttion, 168–160/59 BC),
ll. 12–14 (for a home citizen in royal service); cf. Sardis VII 1 4 (c. 155 BC), ll. 7–9.
22. See Irwin 1996.
23. Compare Quaß 1993: 49.
24. E.g., IG II3 1 857 (293/2 BC), ll. 28–30; I.Priene2 34 (new edition of I.Priene 81) (before
200 BC), ll. 2–11.
25. E.g., IG II2 1006 (Athens, 122/1 BC), ll. 56–58; IG IV2 2 750 (Aigina, 82 BC (?)), ll. 2–8.
26. E.g., ID 1505 (decree of Athenians on Delos for agoranomoi, 146/5 or 145/4 BC), ll. 6–9; I.
Priene2 34, ll. 8–9.
27. E.g., IG II3 1 857, ll. 29–30; I.Mylasa 101 (later Hellenistic), ll. 44–46. By contrast with their
Hellenistic successors throughout the Greek world, the Classical Athenians may in general have given
prominence to procedural virtues in their honorific rhetoric concerning home citizens, at least before c.
350, possibly partly because they suspected that more substantive notions of virtue might have aristo-
cratic connotations: see Whitehead 1993: 37–75. However, substantiating this thesis is hampered by
the poor evidence for pre-350 BC Athenian honorific rhetoric concerning citizens.
28. E.g., I.Priene2 46 (new edition of I.Priene 82) (c. 213–190 BC), ll. 12–15.
29. E.g., SEG 28.60 (Athens, 270/69 BC), ll. 38–39: Kallias of Sphettos is described as [π]άντα
πράττων τὰ συμφέροντα τεῖ πόλει.
30. E.g., SEG 28.60 (Athens, 270/69 BC), ll. 61–62, 78–83.
31. E.g., I.Priene2 28 (new edition of I.Priene 17) (after 278/77 BC), ll. 19–37.
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defining virtue, in a way strongly resembling the virtue rhetoric of Hellenistic decrees,
as a “capacity to do good to others” (δύναμις εὐεργετική).32
Decrees’ interest in maximal benefactions is nevertheless sometimes qualified
with a concern for the distribution of the benefits conferred. For instance, in an
example from a decree for a foreigner,33 the second-century BC Aiginetan decree
for the Attalid governor Kleon explicitly states that he was responsible for “good,”
in accordance with justice.34 The virtue of δικαιοσύνη (justice) often attributed to
Hellenistic honorands, probably often retained this association with the distribution
of goods: for example, the adverb δικαίως (“justly”) could be paired with the
adverb ἴσως (“equally”).35 Decrees’ frequent concern with distributive justice as
well as benevolence also chimes with Aristotle’s approach in the Rhetoric, where
his identification of virtue as involving benefaction is closely followed by an anal-
ysis of the virtue of justice as “the virtue through which each has his own, within
the bounds of the law.”36
In the same way as the typical content of Hellenistic honorary decrees for
home citizens reflected very widespread Greek ethical assumptions, one of the
principal functions of such decrees was also strongly consistent with those widely
shared basic ideas. By passing and publishing honorary decrees, poleis used pub-
lic political institutions and language for educational ends, establishing and prop-
agating paradigms of good citizenship for other citizens to emulate.37 This can be
seen as a practical implementation of a pervasive line of Greek political thinking,
strongly advocated by Aristotle and the Peripatetics: it is not only legitimate, but
also vital, that civic institutions educate citizens in virtue, thereby “making the
polis one.”38
In most respects, therefore, the content and function of Hellenistic decrees for
home citizens can be equated only with the widespread, commonsensical Greek
ethical ideas collected by Aristotle in his Rhetoric, which closely resemble the
generic rhetoric about virtue and the polis of, for example, much fourth-century
Attic oratory. A different case can, however, be made concerning another function
of the institution. The institution of the honorary decree for a home citizen can be
viewed, with regard to the kinds of relationships between citizens which it created
and secured, as a practical embodiment of a complex ethical and political approach
to friendship similar to that advocated by Aristotle in his ethical works, and
32. Arist. Rh. 1366a38, 1366b4.
33. Although the main focus of this article is on decrees for home citizens, honored foreigners
were often, as here, praised almost as if they were members of the civic community, or, at least, of
an enlarged community of those benevolently disposed to the polis.
34. IG IV2 2 749 (Aigina, 159–144 BC), ll. 22–24.
35. E.g., I.Priene2 19, ll. 8–10.
36. Arist. Rh. 1366b9–10.
37. See, for example, Veyne 1976: 239; Rosen 1987: 287–89; Errington 2002: 19–20; Liddel
2007: 165, 167.
38. Arist. Pol. 1263b36–37. Compare Tsouni 2018, text (doxography C in Stobaeus, attributed to
Arius Didymus), sec. 27 Ts, 152.17–18 (also Sharples 2010, chapter 15, text A, section 52).
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developed by Hellenistic Peripatetics.39 Aristotle presents in his works an ambiva-
lent picture of the “political friendship” that holds together a good polis. His
slightly fluid and equivocal picture appears to leave room for political friendship
to combine features of both “utility friendship,” mutual good will based on recog-
nition of shared interest, and “virtue friendship,” mutual good will arising from
mutual appreciation of good character.40
Honorary decrees for home citizens presented a similar mixed picture of the
nature of the relationship of reciprocal good will (εὔνοια) to which they give prom-
inence.41 This relationship is partly one of utility friendship (friendship διὰ τὸ
χρήσιμον): decrees sometimes make it explicit that the honorand is being honored
because he has been, or is, “useful” (χρήσιμος) for polis life, or some aspect of it.42
The δῆμος responds with reciprocal honors and rewards, often including privileges
and exemptions of material value, which are themselves immediately useful to the
honorand. From this perspective, the relationship between honorand and fellow
citizens is based on a particular form of χάρις (“grace” or “gratitude”): the δῆμος
shows gratitude towards the benefactor, which itself demands further reciprocal
benefactions. The centrality of χάρις to Hellenistic civic ideology is elsewhere evi-
dent in the paying of cult to the Χάριτες.43
On the other hand, the civic friendship involved in decrees is also close to
Aristotelian character or virtue friendship (friendship δι’ ἀρετήν). The honoring
δῆμος almost always publicizes its appreciation of the virtuous character of the
honorand, commenting on his ἀρετή or calling him a “good man” (ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός).
Indeed, the two basic features of Aristotelian character friendship are combined in
the ubiquitous formula that honors are awarded on account of the honorand’s virtue
and good will (ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ εὐνοίας). Occasionally, a decree makes it explicit
that this relationship of virtue friendship is reciprocal: the honorand recognizes that
the honoring community is a group whose members’ characters are such that they
particularly appreciate virtue.44 The intangible honors granted through decrees,
39. See, for example, Tsouni 2018, text, sec. 3 Ts, 120.8–122.4; sec. 21 Ts, 143.1–17 (also
Sharples 2010, chapter 15, text A, sections 4–5 and 37).
40. For discussion, see Cooper 1999: esp. 370–72; Irwin 2007: 226–27.
41. Compare Gray 2015: 78, with 69–71.
42. Some examples involving citizen honorands: IG II3 1 359 (Athens, 328/7 BC), ll. 17–19;
I.Priene2 19, ll. 11–12. In a case involving a civic subdivision, the Otorkondeis of Mylasa praised
Iatrokles (cf. above) for having made himself useful for both individuals and the whole δῆμος
([κ]ατ’ ἰδίαν ἐ[νίοις] τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ κατὰ κοινὸν τῶι σύμπαντι δήμωι χρήσιμον ἑαυτὸν
παρέσχηται, I.Mylasa 109, ll. 5–6).
43. The cult of Δῆμος and the Χάριτες was introduced in Athens in the later second century BC:
see Mikalson 1998: ch. 6, discussing earlier bibliography. As scholars have noted, Aristotle himself
refers to cult of the Χάριτες as a means for cities to encourage benefactions: Arist. EN 1133a3–4; com-
pare Tsouni 2018, text, sec. 22 Ts, 143.19–24 (also Sharples 2010, chapter 15, text A, section 38). For
a Hellenistic example outside Athens, consider the cult of the Χάριτες and Μνήμη in Hellenistic Teos:
Ma 2002: text no. 18 (probably 203 BC), l. 34.
44. See I.Priene2 68 (new edition of I.Priene 112) (mid-first century BC), ll. 13–14, discussed in
section 3b below.
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especially the praise itself and resulting recognition, fit particularly well into the
context of an Aristotelian virtue friendship.
It is possible that honorary decrees for home citizens were among the many
environmental influences that shaped Aristotle’s reflections about types of friend-
ship and their relationship to politics. Indeed, the practice of passing honorary
decrees for home citizens probably gained prominence during Aristotle’s time
in Athens: such decrees came to be regularly inscribed at Athens from the 340s
onwards.45 In any case, both Aristotle’s ethical philosophy and the genre of the
honorary decree for a leading citizen reflect the same complexity or uncertainty
in attempts to understand the polis: the polis is viewed simultaneously as an asso-
ciation for mutual utility (διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον), in which actions, agreement, and
material contributions and rewards are paramount,46 and a community of virtue
(δι’ ἀρετήν), in which citizens’ characters, intentions, and mutual appreciation
are primary.
3. INCREASED ETHICAL COMPLEXITY IN LATER HELLENISTIC
DECREES
After c. 150 BC, some honorary decrees showed much greater complexity in
articulating and developing the basic ethical framework identified in the previous
section, in ways much more directly comparable with ancient philosophical
approaches. To posit this change is not to deny that earlier Hellenistic decrees
could be complex documents, rich in descriptive content. Indeed, as Rosen shows,
there was an earlier transition towards greater complexity around 330 BC, when
honorary decrees of Athens and other poleis, increasingly passed and inscribed
for home citizens as well as foreigners, began to describe in detail honorands’
whole careers and specific civic contributions, evidence for their lifelong virtue.47
However, only in the later Hellenistic period did a significant number of decree-
drafters begin to use concentrations of abstract, elevated language, sometimes
expressing second-order ideas about the nature of virtue and its connections with
human nature, desire, emotion, material goods, happiness, and the polis. It is in
relation to these fundamental issues that it is possible to identify the closest and
most interesting overlaps with fourth-century BC ethical writing, including not
only the commonplaces of Aristotle’s Rhetoric or much fourth-century Attic ora-
tory, but also the distinctive ethical rhetoric and teachings of Plato’s dialogues
and especially Aristotle’s ethical works, a tradition which was also being devel-
oped by sympathetic Hellenistic philosophers.
45. Liddel 2007: 161.
46. Compare Arist. EE 1243a31–32: “civic [sc. friendship] looks to the agreement and the thing”
(ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτικὴ βλέπει εἰς τὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα).
47. Rosen 1987: 282–85, discussing the second Athenian decree for the younger Euphron, the
Prienian decree for Apellis, and the Nesian decree for Thersippos.
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This later Hellenistic period is traditionally interpreted as one in which the ideals
favored by Aristotle were in eclipse. Indeed, Gauthier argued that poleis’ image of
the good civic benefactor sometimes shifted in the later Hellenistic period from that
of the modest, power-sharing, law-bound citizen to that of the magnanimous quasi-
monarch.48 It is certainly true that, as Gauthier argued, certain republican political
ideals which Aristotle strongly favored were under some strain, though certainly
not moribund: ideals of power-sharing, political equality, and public scrutiny were
put under pressure by some (always partial and contested) tendencies towards the
“privatization,” “domestication,” or even “depoliticization” of civic life.49
Indeed, in many poleis in the later Hellenistic period, there was a particularly
marked tendency, probably an intensification of earlier trends,50 for leading bene-
factors to gain new, less constrained types of power, often by holding continuous
office and using their wealth to exercise extensive influence and patronage outside
the official, regulated channels of magistracies and assembly debates. Crucially,
local elites could now be formally honored for contributions, such as one-off dona-
tions or hospitality in their own homes, which they made outside the context of
formal office, or beyond the standard responsibilities of a magistracy they did
hold.51 Some benefactors could even use their wealth to buy exemptions from for-
mal magistracies and liturgies.52 Local elites had amassed estates and resources as a
result of long-term changes across the Hellenistic period, which can be traced in
Asia Minor,53 but the disappearance of Hellenistic kings and royal monopolies cre-
ated new economic and political opportunities for them, not least to fill the void as
indispensable civic benefactors.54
In a parallel sign of pressure on the “Aristotelian” polis model, the traditional
conception of citizenship (politeia), captured by Aristotle, was put under some strain
by mixing of people and inequalities within cities in the course of the Hellenistic
period, especially in the unstable and cosmopolitan environment of the early
Roman Empire. Politeia was no longer so predictably a uniform, single status for
a class of equal citizens; its privileges and obligations could increasingly be parceled
out and assigned separately, depending on a particular benefactor’s context and
claims.55
Nevertheless, as argued in detail in this section, the frequent, paradoxical cor-
ollary of this pressure on political ideals consistent with Aristotle’s in the later
Hellenistic period was an increased emphasis on, and detailed articulation of,
48. Gauthier 1985: 56–59, criticized (for example) by van Bremen 1996: 11–12.
49. See Gauthier in his introduction to Fröhlich and Müller 2005: 5–6.
50. See especially Quaß 1993: e.g., 15–16; Habicht 1995.
51. On these developments, see Gauthier 1985: esp. 55–56; Quaß 1993; Müller 1995: 41–54;
van Bremen 1996: esp. 156–70; Fröhlich 2005; Hamon 2005; Dreyer 2010: esp. 351, 356–57,
363–64; Thonemann 2011: 204–205; 2016: 128–32.
52. I.Priene2 144 (new edition of I.Priene 174) (c. 130 BC), ll. 35–38.
53. See Thonemann 2011: 246–51.
54. Compare Ameling 2004: 137, 141–42, 160; Dreyer 2004: 234; see also Plb. 5.90.5.
55. Müller 2014.
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ethical ideals strongly convergent with Aristotle’s. These included ideals giving
prominence to far-reaching civic virtue, civic community, sharing of wealth, ethical
education, and the connections between citizenship and personal happiness: ideals
which could constrain and shape citizens’ conduct where law and procedural checks
and balances could not.
It is important not to make the division between early and later Hellenistic civic
life too sharp a caesura. As critics of Gauthier’s position have stressed, wealthy civic
benefactors already constituted a powerful, wealthy, hereditary euergetical elite
within most poleis even in the Classical period, and certainly in the early and mid-
Hellenistic period.56 Conversely, many democratic institutions, formal obligations,
and checks and balances endured into the later Hellenistic period, together with
a vibrant public sphere of debate and scrutiny.57 The best interpretation of the
socio-political background to the changing rhetoric of decrees is, therefore, that
social developments after c. 150 BC intensified processes that had long shaped
Greek civic life, and which came to a head in the honorific process, even in the more
simple decrees analyzed above in section 2.
Throughout the later Classical and Hellenistic period, leading, politically active
members of civic elites drafted speeches which became the basis of honorary decrees
for their fellow elite citizens,58 or probably even sometimes for themselves.59
However, the proposals they wrote and rhetorically delivered in the assembly had
to be attractive to the δῆμος, gathered in the civic assembly to vote on them. The
result was bargaining between the wealthy elite and the rest of the citizens, in which
rewards and honors were exchanged for civic contributions,60 with the wealthy often
deriving great advantages. For example, in a way consistent with Aristotle’s ethics,
many of the resulting honorary decrees allowed considerable scope, not only for
civic virtue and community, but also for individual self-seeking and profit-making.61
According to the ethics of those decrees, citizens were entitled to exercise wide-
ranging freedom in acquiring and preserving wealth and social standing, relatively
unconstrained by institutional and normative checks on their behavior. However,
this was all tolerated only on the condition, entrenched by the demos in decrees
and also consistent with Aristotle’s political thinking, that the wealthy should volun-
tarily use resulting private resources and prestige to promote communal welfare and
56. See Schmitt-Pantel 1992: e.g., 201, 208; Quaß 1993: e.g., 15–16; Habicht 1995: esp. 89;
Savalli-Lestrade 2003: 56–57; Schuler 2005: 387, 400. Compare, from the period before Gauthier
1985, Veyne 1976: e.g., 210. On the early origins of euergetism, see now Domingo Gygax 2016.
57. See recently Wiemer 2016: 31. On the complex, shifting, and mixed political culture of the
Hellenistic cities, and the nature and extent of later Hellenistic changes, see recently Fröhlich and
Müller 2005; Mann and Scholz 2012; Kah 2015 and other contributions to Matthaei and Zimmermann
2015; compare also van Nijf and Alston 2011.
58. For elite citizens as drafters of honorary decrees, see Fröhlich 2005: 255, with n.118.
59. Compare Errington 2002: 25–26.
60. For the Classical Athenian precedents, see Ober 1989; Descat 1995: esp. 985–88; for the con-
tinuation of these phenomena in the Hellenistic period, see (for example) Habicht 1995: 92; Ma 2013;
for their further continuation in the Imperial-era Greek city, see Zuiderhoek 2009.
61. For the corresponding element in Aristotle’s political thought, see Yack 1993.
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the ethical education of fellow citizens.62 The new conditions of the later Hellenistic
world intensified these processes, yielding more ambitious assertions of individual
and elite power, but also ever more idealistic conceptions of civic virtue.
Bargaining between benefactors and beneficiaries cannot, however, offer a full
explanation of the honorific process and honorific rhetoric. As Veyne stressed, it is
also necessary to give weight to non-instrumental motivations, including the collec-
tive protection of the social distance of the elite from their fellow citizens.63 Veyne
himself sometimes calls on Aristotle’s notions of “magnanimity” (μεγαλοψυχία) and
benevolence (εὐεργεσία) to capture the relevant attitude of Hellenistic great
benefactors.64
In addition, honorary decrees should be read as products of collaborative pursuit
of visions of a just, sustainable civic order. Both the demos and benefactors seeking
to distribute the civic burden widely sought effective arguments and motivational
devices to persuade and stimulate all citizens to use their talents and resources vol-
untarily for the common good. Even if the significance and strength of the formal,
regulated public financing of civic life by Greek poleis were often greater than
sometimes thought, especially for the Hellenistic period,65 euergetical benefactions
were always a necessary supplement. The changed conditions of the later Hellenistic
period posed the problem of civic stability and finance with renewed urgency: often
chronic debt crises and the expansion of costly civic cultural and educational activi-
ties made voluntary, euergetical donations more indispensable than ever,66 for
example in the funding of civic gymnasia.67 This demanded the articulation of a
more subtle, arresting vision in decrees of the centrality of civic virtue in the good
life, which could persuade the mobile and relatively untouchable rich. Appeal to eth-
ical ideals consonant with Aristotle’s, including the combination of material incen-
tives with more ethical and patriotic arguments, was central to this project.
The rest of this section presents and interprets the detailed evidence for the late
Hellenistic developments in decrees’ ethics, examining in turn decrees’ approaches
to five major areas of debate: first, the question of the psychological nature of
virtuous states of character; second, the question whether virtue necessarily bene-
fits its possessor; third, the question whether, if virtue does indeed necessarily con-
tribute to a happy, fulfilled life, bodily and “external” goods (especially material
resources) are also necessary for happiness or fulfillment (eudaimonia); fourth,
the question of what role, if they do indeed contribute to it, external goods play
in the happy, fulfilled life; and, fifth, the question whether it is necessary to be a
citizen of a polis in order to live a virtuous life. Most of the examples are derived
62. Compare Rosen 1987: 291, criticized by Errington 2002: 20–21. For these phenomena in
Classical Athenian civic life, compare Whitehead 1983.
63. Veyne 1976: 200, 218–19, 238.
64. Veyne 1976: 241, 270.
65. See Schuler 2005: esp. 387.
66. See Gauthier 1985: 72; Fröhlich 2005: esp. 254–55 (on later Hellenistic Priene).
67. Schuler 2004: 190–91 (on the eventual dependence of Hellenistic civic gymnasia on funding
provided by unelected benefactors, not only elected gymnasiarchs).
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from decrees of the poleis of Western Asia Minor, but some comparative evidence
is drawn from other regions. The question of whether there was any philosophical
influence on relevant decrees is deferred until section 4: this section itself seeks
only to show significant similarities in principles and sensibility.
A ) WHAT I S THE P SY CHOLOGY OF THE V I R TUOU S AGENT ?
Drafters of later Hellenistic honorary decrees shared their predecessors’ pre-
dominant concern with states of character and intentions, as opposed to discrete acts
in isolation. However, a significant number of later Hellenistic decree-drafters took a
more detailed interest than earlier drafters in the precise psychology of virtuous
action, using relatively sophisticated concepts and rhetoric comparable to those
common in Greek philosophical debates, especially (but not only) Aristotelian and
Peripatetic contributions.
The Sestian decree for Menas (120s BC) illustrates the new psychological com-
plexity possible in a later Hellenistic decree. It praises Menas for organizing physical
activities in the gymnasium through which the “souls” (ψυχαί) of young citizens were
led “in their characters” (τοῖς ἤθεσιν) towards virtue (πρὸς ἀρετήν).68 Similarly, the
Iasian citizen Melanion was praised in a first-century BC decree for having an appro-
priate “state” (ἕξις) during his philosophical studies: the fact that this “state” was
“appropriate” for philosophical studies makes clear that it was a state of soul or char-
acter.69 The word ἕξις is very rare in inscriptions, but central to philosophical studies
of moral psychology, not least Aristotle’s.70
A significant number of later Hellenistic decree-drafters expressed or applied
versions of a principle of moral psychology to which the major philosophical schools
were in different ways all committed: the principle that a virtuous agent’s soul should
be a harmonious unity; that its psychological faculties, intentions, and decisions
should be aligned with one another and with the agent’s actions.71 For example, when
the leading citizen Apollonios was posthumously honored at Metropolis in approxi-
mately 130 BC, he was praised for accepting the leadership of a group of young citi-
zen soldiers in the war against Aristonikos, “deciding (προαιρούμενος) to make clear
his good will (εὔνοιαν) through his actions (διὰ τῶν ἔργων).”72 Similarly, Moschion of
Priene was praised in the later second century BC for deciding (προαι[ρ]ούμενο[̣ς])
and later wishing (βουλόμενο[ς]) to “be consistent with himself” (στοιχεῖν ἑαυτῶι)
by assisting his polis in particular ways.73
This concern with internal psychological consistency and action guided by
stable psychological states was in harmony with Stoic thought. For example, in
68. I.Sestos 1, ll. 71–72.
69. I.Iasos 98, ll. 15–16.
70. E.g., Arist. EN 1105b19–1106a24.
71. For different approaches to the ideal of psychological consistency among Classical and
Hellenistic philosophers, see Gill 2006.
72. I.Metropolis 1, face A, ll. 24–25.
73. I.Priene2 64 (new edition of I.Priene 108) (after 129 BC), ll. 69, 162.
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the Stoic tradition, Seneca argues that one’s impulse (impetus) and action (actio)
should coincide, “so that you are in agreement with yourself” (ut . . . tibi ipse
consentias):74 in other words, it is important to be consistent with oneself
(στοιχεῖν ἑαυτῶι), as in the Prienian decree. Furthermore, the broader psycholog-
ical focus of many later Hellenistic decrees, evident in these examples, chimes
with the central interest of Hellenistic ethical philosophers, both Stoic and
Epicurean, in offering therapy and guidance for individual souls, by prescribing all-
encompassing enlightened “ways of life” through which individuals can engage in
“care” or “technology” of the self.75
However, there were also significant differences between the moral psychology
of these decrees and that of relevant Hellenistic philosophers. For one thing, a bene-
factor’s psychological condition was always embedded in a decree in the context of
a particular city community: it was defined against the background of an inherited,
consensual civic culture of norms and institutions (compare section 3e below).76
Even as far as the intrinsic qualities of a good psychological state are concerned,
relevant decrees tended to portray something different from the Stoic ideal, let alone
the Epicurean ideal of pleasant contentment. Indeed, a significant number of later
Hellenistic decree-drafters gave prominence to a particular type of psychological con-
sistency central to Aristotle’s ethical philosophy. This is harmony between distinct
sources of motivation: between the virtuous agent’s considered thoughts and his
desires; between his deliberated beliefs and his feelings of pleasure and pain; between
his reason and his emotions. In relevant decrees, as in Aristotle, good desires, plea-
sures, and emotions could play their own distinct, positive, active role in the agent’s
virtue, in harmony with the contribution of his reason.
In the tradition established by Chrysippus, the Stoics argued that the virtuous
man should mainly eliminate or subjugate to true reason his passions, which are
really false value judgments; there is only one source of motivation.77 As Graver
has shown, the Stoics were not as implacably hostile to all emotion as their modern
stereotype might suggest: although the unruly passions (pathe) must be subjugated,
beneficial states of “good feeling” (εὐπάθεια), such as joy, which remain after pas-
sions have been eradicated, can accompany or even complement rational decision-
making.78 However, it would still have been a departure from the distinctiveness
of the Stoa for any Stoic to argue that emotion comes anywhere near matching rati-
ocination in making its own distinct, active contribution to helping an individual
identify the virtuous action to take and motivating him to perform it.
By contrast, it was a distinctive claim of Aristotle’s moral psychology that consid-
ered thoughts, deliberated beliefs, and reason, on the one hand, and desires, pleasures,
74. Sen. Ep. 89.14.
75. Long 2006: 26–27, citing M. Foucault; compare P. Hadot 1995; Sorabji 2002: esp. chs. 13–16.
76. See Long 2006: 26–27 for this as a crucial difference between Aristotelian and Stoic/
Epicurean ethics.
77. See Sorabji 2002: esp. chs. 13–14.
78. See Graver 2007: esp. chs. 2–3.
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and emotions, on the other, are all active components of an overarching state of virtue.
Aristotle presents virtue of character as a disposition to experience an appropriate,
rationally determined or determinable “mean” quality and amount of emotion and
pleasure in any circumstances, as well as to perform corresponding actions.79 Such
a state of virtue of character is necessary for developing practical rationality
(φρόνησις), in the same way as φρόνησις is necessary for developing such virtue of
character.80 Moreover, Aristotle classifies virtue of character as, in psychological
terms, a ἕξις προαιρετική:81 it is a state of character involving, or leading to, decision
(προαίρεσις). Such a state of character necessarily includes both dispositions to think
and deliberate and dispositions to feel and desire in particular ways,82 for Aristotle
elsewhere defines προαίρεσις as a “deliberated desire” concerning things in our power
(βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν).83
Hellenistic Peripatetics sustained and developed this distinctive feature of
Aristotle’s philosophy, continuing to insist on the positive, active role of pathos in
shaping and motivating virtuous action, alongside logos. This approach recurs, for
example, in the summary of Peripatetic ethics found in Stobaeus,84 which is tradition-
ally attributed to the Augustan philosopher Arius Didymus. Although it could have
been written by a quite different Didymus, this summary certainly bears strong marks
of later Hellenistic Peripatetic debates.85 Since it is one of the best pieces of evidence
for tendencies in Hellenistic Peripatetic ethics, especially in the later Hellenistic
period, this summary will be a key text for comparison with decrees in the rest of this
article. Hellenistic Peripatetics advocated their Aristotelian approach to pathos in
polemical opposition to Stoic thinking on the topic, advocating moderation of passion
(metriopatheia) rather than absence of passion (apatheia).86 Indeed, as Inwood puts it,
“in the increasingly sharp debate between Peripatetics and Stoics which characterized
ethics between the mid-second century BCE and the first century CE, the passions
became one of the two key points of debate (the other being the number and signifi-
cance of the goods)” (for the latter, compare section 3c below).87
Some Hellenistic decrees dating to before c. 150 BC already show an interest
in balancing different sources of motivation. For example, the Athenian decree
79. Arist. EN 1106b10–1107a2.
80. Arist. EN 1144b31–32.
81. Arist. EN 1106b36.
82. See Wiggins 1975–1976; Charles 1984: esp. 58, 137–43; Long 2002: 212–14.
83. Arist. EN 1113a10–11.
84. Tsouni 2018, text, sec. 10 Ts, 128.18–26; sec. 17 Ts. 139.1–18 (also Sharples 2010: chapter
15, text A, sections 13 and 32). For Peripatetic ideas about the passions, see also the texts in Sharples
2010: chapter 16; Inwood 2014: 88–103.
85. Schmitz 2014 (esp. chs. 4 and 6) and 2017 shows how this summary can be closely and fruit-
fully linked with Peripatetic debates of the first century BC also known from other sources; compare
also Inwood 2014: 77–78 (favoring a later first-century BC context). On the other hand, for skepticism
about the possibility of identifying even the approximate date (let alone the author) of the summary
itself, see Hahm 2018.
86. See, for example, Sharples 2010: chapter 16, text I.
87. Inwood 2014: 91; compare Sharples 2010: 146.
GRAY: A Civic Alternative to Stoicism 201
of 285/4 BC for King Audoleon of the Paionians claims that he shared in Athenian
pleasure in the recent recapture of the town of Athens by the Athenian δῆμος,
thinking that his own salvation and that of the δῆμος were common (νομίζων
εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ αὐτ[ῶ]ι τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν).88 Like Aristotle’s well-
habituated, virtuous man, therefore, Audoleon experienced positive pleasure which
was aligned with his rational political judgment.89
Nevertheless, this kind of moral psychological approach became more pro-
nounced and widespread in inscriptions in the later Hellenistic period. For example,
in the clearest sign of convergence with Peripatetic thinking and divergence from
Stoicism, some decrees explicitly celebrated emotion as an active source of virtuous
motivation. Pathos was strikingly cited as a desirable aim in the mid-first-century
BC first decree of Priene for Zosimos, which praised him for providing a tutor in
philology in the gymnasium, helping to lead the young men’s souls towards virtue
and “humane emotion” (πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ πάθος ἀνθρώπινον).90 Although such an
explicit reference to the concept of pathos is rare in epigraphy, Chaniotis has
recently shown how Hellenistic (especially later Hellenistic) inscribed decrees
showed an intense interest in describing and prompting emotional responses among
citizens, including as positive sources of civic motivation.91
Other later Hellenistic decrees also spelled out in detail the value of balancing
rational belief with alternative sources of motivation, even though they did not
explicitly stress the positive contribution of pathos to motivation in a way that would
automatically have alienated Stoics. In an extended example, the later Hellenistic
Mylasans endorsed a long honorary decree which gave equal weight throughout to
the citizen Ouliades’ thinking and desiring. The participle σπεύδων (“being eager
to”) is used three times in the decree, to convey Ouliades’ enthusiasm and desire
to contribute to the common good in different ways.92 However, early in the decree
he is praised for serving as a magistrate, including as a “councilor” (βουλευτής),
“always sticking to the best state of mind” or “judgment” ([τῆς ἀρίστ]ης̣ ἀεὶ
γνώμης ἀντεχόμενος):93 Ouliades’ virtuous aspirations were accompanied by the
best possible cognitive state. Moreover, immediately after the second use of the par-
ticiple σπεύδων, the participle νομίζων (“thinking”) is used, as if to balance it out. It
is first commented that Ouliades participated in some diplomatic business, “being
eager to join in increasing, as far as was in his power, the good will and friendship
accruing to the δῆμος” (σπεύ[δ]ων ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶι σ[υ]να̣ύ[ξ]ειν τὴν ὑπά-
[ρχ]ο[υσαν] τῶι δήμωι εὔνοιάν τε κα[ὶ φι]λίαν). In a continuation of the same sen-
tence, it is then claimed that, “thinking that it was best also that the citizens should
conduct their shared life, as far as it was in his power, in concord” (κάλλιστον δὲ
88. IG II3 1 871, ll. 18–21.
89. See Arist. EN 1104b3–1105a16; 1140b16–19.
90. I.Priene2 68, ll. 74–77.
91. E.g., Chaniotis 2013a and b, 2015.
92. I.Mylasa 101, ll. 9, 37–38, 50.
93. I.Mylasa 101, ll. 5–6.
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νομίζων εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοὺς [π]ο[λί]τα[ς] ὅσον ἐστὶ[ν ἐφ’ ἑ]αυτῶ̣ι μεθ’ ὁμ[ον]οίας τὴν
μετ’ ἀλλήλων συναναστροφὴν ποιεῖσθαι), Ouliades acted as arbitrator and judge to
resolve disputes between citizens.94 Ouliades’ civic enthusiasm was thus accompa-
nied by an intellectual grasp of the ethical importance of civic concord.
The rise to prominence of particular complex psychological words, used to
replace or accompany well-established, comparatively bland terms such as ἀρετή
and εὐνοία, reflects widespread attachment among decree-drafters, probably often
unconscious or unreflective, to this kind of moral psychological approach. Later
Hellenistic decree-drafters quite commonly ascribed to honorands the new attribute
of φιλαγαθία (“love of the good”).95 Use of that word implied that the relevant hon-
orand possessed an intellectual grasp of the abstract category of “the good.”
However, it also implied that the honorand aspired to act ethically. Indeed, it sug-
gested that desire for the good had displaced baser, counter-rational desires: the
neoi (young men) of Amphipolis praised their gymnasiarch for φιλαγαθία and
ἀφιλα[ργυρία] (“lack of love of money”).96 This concern with the suppression of
baser desires by a passionate as well as theoretical commitment to the good97 is
probably paralleled in the first decree from Priene for Zosimos (mentioned above):
Zosimos was praised for “never pursuing his own enjoyment (?) in a way revealing a
lack of experience of the fine” (ἐν οὐδενὶ δὲ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀπιροκάλω[̣ς διώκων
ἀπόλαυ]σιν).98 The idealistic rhetoric about love of the good evident in the
Amphipolitan and the Prienian texts, a new departure in the later Hellenistic period,
strongly recalls the orientation of Plato’s ethical philosophy: virtue in the soul is a
matter of experiencing, appreciating, and knowing the Good, such that counter-
rational desires subside.
Another relevant complex psychological word prominent in later Hellenistic
decrees was the word προαίρεσις,99 often used interchangeably in inscriptions with
the word αἵρεσις. The word προαίρεσις, which is not attested in inscriptions of the
Classical period, became a relatively standard term in Hellenistic epigraphy; it is par-
ticularly richly attested in later Hellenistic inscriptions.100 Significantly, it was a word
which, as Allen has shown, came to prominence in the mid- to late fourth century BC,
both in Aristotle’s philosophy and in some Athenian oratory.101 Although central to
94. I.Mylasa 101, ll. 36–46.
95. Among many later Hellenistic examples, see, for example, I.Priene2 69 (new edition of
I.Priene 113) (mid-first century BC), ll. 94, 103–104, 118–20; I.Mylasa 101, ll. 10–11, 23.
96. SEG 30.546 (Amphipolis, later second–early first century BC), ll. 42–45. Compare I.Ephesos
6 (late Hellenistic), ll. 21–22: the gymnasiarch Diodoros behaved μισοπονήρως τε καὶ φιλαγάθως.
97. Compare the contrast between φιλαγαθία and φιλαυτία at Arist. MM 2.14.
98. I.Priene2 68, l. 13.
99. For fuller discussion of the importance of this word in Hellenistic decrees and ideology, see
Gray forthcoming.
100. Compare Chaniotis 2015: 96–97.
101. See Allen 2006. Although the simultaneous emergence of the word in both philosophy and
Attic oratory is good evidence for the porous boundary between the two, Allen is probably too quick to
see a simple “migration” of the concept from philosophy to political rhetoric. For one thing, fourth-century
orators use the word to refer to an extended state, not (like Aristotle) to a discrete ethical decision.
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Aristotle’s ethical philosophy, the word was virtually absent from Hellenistic Stoic
works.102 In other Hellenistic prose, such as Polybius and Diodorus, the word was
commonly used with the fairly banal meaning of “policy,”103 which partly mirrors
the Hellenistic move to use the word to refer to affiliation to a particular philosophical
school.104 In honorary decrees, however, it was frequently used with an explicitly
broader, more ethical meaning, similar to its use in relevant fourth-century Athenian
speeches:105 it was used to convey something very close to Aristotle’s “considered
preferential state” (ἕξις προαιρετική). That is to say, many relevant Hellenistic decree
drafters represented προαίρεσις as a long-term106 psychological state central to virtu-
ous states of character.107 As for its internal psychological character, decrees repre-
sented προαίρεσις as something like an integrated state of “deliberated desire”
(Aristotle’s βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις) concerning things in the agent’s power:108 a coherent,
unitary composite of thought and desire with an immediate practical focus.
One particularly revealing example illustrates the composite psychological
character of relevant decree drafters’ notion of προαίρεσις. In the first century BC,
the citizens of Hellenistic Kalamai in Messenia praised a fellow citizen for his
“προαίρεσις of mind [or judgment] towards common affairs and. . .” (προαίρεσις
γν̣ώ̣μης εἴς τε τὰ κοινά. . .).109 In this case, the intrinsic association of the word
προαίρεσις with deliberation and considered belief was made explicit through the
reference to “mind” or “judgment” (γνώμη). However, the honorand’s προαίρεσις
was also represented as “directed towards” (εἰς) common affairs, rather than simply
as a judgment: it was also an emotional or desiderative attitude, presumably capable
of directly motivating patriotic action.
This directed, motivating, non-intellectual component to προαίρεσις is even
clearer in the common tendency in decrees to describe an honorand’s προαίρεσις
as directed towards (εἰς or πρός) the δῆμος or some other body,110 which evokes
102. See Long 2002: 211; Frede 2011: 45. The Stoic Epictetus exploited the word in the Imperial
period, perhaps wresting it from the Peripatetics (Inwood 2014: 74–75, 104), but he gave it an inno-
vative meaning, to refer to a faculty of volition (see Long 2002: 211–14, 217).
103. E.g., Plb. 18.3.6; 27.15.16; 29.25.2; 30.6.3–8; compare D.S. 14.45.4; 16.32.3.
104. See Glucker 1978: 169–92, with discussion of this and the other Hellenistic usages.
105. See Allen 2006.
106. See Welles 1934: 310; compare Wilhelm 1938–1939: 129–30 (on the participle
αἰρούμενος). See also Ma 2002: 189.
107. See, for example, SGDI II 2677 (Delphi, 189/8 BC), ll. 16–17 (praise for an honorand “for
his piety and the rest of his προαίρεσις,” ἐπὶ τᾶι εὐσεβείαι καὶ ἐπὶ τᾶι λοιπᾶι προαιρέσει); I.Iasos 98
(first century BC), ll. 16–19 (Melanion gave a fine demonstration of his own προαίρεσις by behaving
“in a self-controlled way, worthy of imitation,” σωφρόνως καὶ ἀξιοζηλώτως). Most striking is an
example from a later period: IG V 1 548 (Sparta, late second–third century AD), ll. 6–10 (praise
for a citizen for his προαίρεσις, obedience, and “all the rest of virtue,” [ἐπὶ τῇ . . .]. . . προαιρέσει
καὶ εὐπειθίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀρετῇ).
108. For an explicit statement of the latter limitation, see IG XII 9 900A (Eretria, second century
BC), ll. 2–6.
109. IG V 1 1370, l. 4.
110. E.g., (to cite two examples at random) SEG 48.1094 (Halasarna, 300–250 BC), l. 10
(προαίρεσις “towards the deme” of a citizen priest); I.Magnesia 92b (Magnesia-on-the-Maeander,
early second century BC), l. 10 (προαίρεσις of a citizen towards his πατρίς).
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an element of “sympathy”111 or solidarity. Significantly, one of the few usages of
προαίρεσις in this way with πρός in a literary text occurs in one of Aristotle’s dis-
cussions of character friendship: character friends have “mutual friendship and a
mutual προαίρεσις towards each other” (ἀντιφιλία καὶ ἀντιπροαίρεσις πρὸς
ἀλλήλους).112
In conclusion, a significant number of later Hellenistic decree-drafters took a
particular interest in the psychological dynamics of virtuous character and action,
using elevated, quasi-philosophical vocabulary. This can be explained as part of
the attempts by those decree-drafters to understand better how to motivate voluntary
virtuous action, for practical reasons that became more acute in later Hellenistic
poleis. Interestingly, many decree-drafters resembled Aristotle, and deviated from
Stoic principles, in emphasizing the desirability of unifying reason with emotion
and desire, which should play their own active, positive role in sustaining virtue;
reason, desire, and emotion should even merge into a coherent, complex psycholog-
ical state such as “love of the good” (φιλαγαθία) or a good “motivational state”
(προαίρεσις).
B ) DOE S V I R TUE NECE S SAR I LY B ENEF I T I T S P O S S E S S OR ?
Certain later Hellenistic decrees also overlap in interesting ways with fourth-
century philosophy, especially Aristotle’s, on the question of the benefits of virtue
for its possessor. One later Hellenistic honorific cliché concerning virtue and
the beneficial was the claim that an honorand had given priority to the interests of
the civic community, ahead of his private interest (τὸ ἴδιον λυσιτελές).113 For exam-
ple, the decree of Priene for Moschion (dating to after 129 BC) includes the com-
ment that he helped to ease a grain crisis by allowing the polis to determine the
price for his contribution, “mindless of what was beneficial (sc. for himself)” (τοῦ
μὲν λυσιτελοῦς ἀφρόντιστον).114 The implication of such language, also attested
in Hellenistic historiography,115 that there is usually an opposition between the “vir-
tuous” and “beneficial” course of action for an agent possesses great intuitive force.
However, it conflicts with the eudaimonist position shared by the major philosophi-
cal schools, endorsed by Platonists, Aristotelians, and Stoics: the position that virtue
and virtuous action necessarily benefit the virtuous man himself, because they are
consistent with man’s true nature as a rational being.116
111. Cf. LSJ3 s.v. προαίρεσις (8).
112. Arist. EE 1236b3.
113. Cf. IG II2 1299 (Athens, c. 234 BC), ll. 58–59; IG XI 4 1055 (Delos, c. 230–220 BC), ll.
12–14; SEG 41.680 (Halasarna, second century BC), ll. 33–38; IG XII 5 860 (Tenos, first century
BC), ll. 10–12.
114. I.Priene2 64, l. 87.
115. See, for example, D.S. 16.32.3: Onomarchos of Phokis advocated war, οὐχ οὕτω τοῦ κοινῇ
συμφέροντος προνοηθείς, ὡς τὸ ἴδιον λυσιτελὲς προκρίνας.
116. See, for example, Arist. EN Book I; Cic. De Off. Book III.
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This example could, therefore, be taken as evidence that later Hellenistic
decree-drafters generally advocated a non-philosophical outlook: one against
which major philosophers were reacting in their eudaimonism. This interpretation
would be supported by the fact that, in his commonsensical account of virtue in his
Rhetoric, Aristotle comments that the greatest virtues are those which are “most
useful” for others, rather than for the agent himself.117
However, this non-philosophical approach was not the only one advocated by
later Hellenistic decree-drafters; in other decrees, perhaps better equipped to per-
suade the wealthy that it was in their own interest to become engaged civic bene-
factors, the stress lay on the advantages of virtue for the virtuous agent himself.
The clearest example is the section of the honorary decree of the Otorkondeis of
Mylasa for a certain Iatrokles, dating to 76 BC, with which I began this article:
ἐπειδὴ Ἰατρ[οκλῆς Δημ]ητρίου Τα[ρκον]δαρεὺς ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡλικίας
τῶν καλλίστων ζηλωτὴς γενόμ[ενος καὶ κ]ατ’ ἰδίαν ἐ[νίοις] τῶν πολιτῶν
καὶ κατὰ κοινὸν τῶι σύμπαντι δήμωι χρήσιμον ἑαυτὸν παρέσχηται,
ὑπολα[βὼν] μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ κηδεμονικῶς αὐτῶν προιστάμενος,
ἐρανίζων δὲ πολλοὺς καὶ τῶ[ν ἄλ]λων πολιτῶν καὶ παριεὶς ἀπὸ τῶν
συναλλαγμάτων, ἀναδιδούς τε τὰ γεινόμενα κατόχ[ιμα] καὶ ἀποδιδοὺς
πίστεις καὶ μείζονας πολλοῖς, λυσιτελεστέραν ἡγούμενος τὴν δικαιοσύ-
[νην] τῆς ἀδικίας, ἔτι δὲ φιλανθρωπῶν ἱκανοὺς τῶν προσδεομένων ξένων.
These are the reasons for the honors: Iatrokles, son of Demetrios, of the
tribe of the Tarkondareis, who has been a striver after the finest things
since his earliest youth, has made himself useful both to individual citi-
zens and to the people as a whole. He takes in hand his relations and looks
after them with great care. He also gives friendly loans to many of the
other citizens and releases them from their contracts, giving back the
deposits which have been made and donating even greater signs of faith
to many, thinking that justice is more profitable than injustice. He has also
acted philanthropically towards suitable poor foreigners. . . .118
The “benefit” or “profit” referred to in λυσιτελεστέραν (“more profitable”) must
have been that accruing to Iatrokles himself rather than to others or to society as a
whole, since the “benefit” of unjust action could hardly come to anyone but
Iatrokles himself. If so, as suggested in the introduction, this text echoes almost
exactly the proposition that Socrates seeks to uphold, in opposition to the arguments
of Thrasymachos, in Book I of Plato’s Republic: “injustice is never more beneficial
than justice” (οὐδέποτε . . . λυσιτελέστερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης).119
117. Arist. Rh. 1366b3–6; Aristotle does, however, even there include virtue among the compo-
nents of happiness (εὐδαιμονία) (Arist. Rh. 1360b14–24).
118. I.Mylasa 109, ll. 4–10.
119. Pl. Rep. 354a8–9; cf. 354b7, 360c8.
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This is a case in which there are strong grounds for suspecting a direct philo-
sophical allusion. The use of the same combination of words as in Plato’s Republic
is highly significant. The phrase was not a cliché: the comparative of λυσιτελής
does not occur together with δικαιοσύνη and ἀδικία in surviving ancient literary
or epigraphic texts other than this one and the Republic. On the contrary, it is
highly distinctive and idiosyncratic: it is striking that ἀδικία is mentioned at all,
when it would have been possible to say merely that Iatrokles thought justice ben-
eficial. It is thus highly plausible that the drafter had encountered the Platonic
words in some source: a collection of “sayings of philosophers,” of the type that
was to become popular in the Imperial period;120 Book I of the Republic, studied
as a self-standing dialogue or school text; or the text of the Republic as a whole.
A consideration in favor of the third possibility is that, as pointed out in the intro-
duction, the phrase does not represent an isolated claim in the Republic, but gives a
first concise summary of the whole approach of that work, later developed into the
argument that justice is always preferable to injustice, even in the worst possible
external circumstances. The decree’s author probably thus used a single phrase
from the Republic in order to suggest to learned readers that Iatrokles was commit-
ted to that work’s metaphysical and ethical system: justice is necessary for the hap-
piness of its possessor, because it constitutes and creates a correct ordering of the
soul. If so, the drafter was radically rejecting the standard epigraphic formula about
the relationship between the virtuous and the beneficial, implying an entirely new
interpretation of “the beneficial” (τὸ λυσιτελές).
Admittedly, the decree-drafter could have intended to suggest only that
Iatrokles recognized that creditors achieve a better final return by treating their
debtors sympathetically, a recognition attributed in a near contemporary Abderite
honorary decree to a creditor.121 However, the probable Platonic allusion counts
against that interpretation of the Iatrokles decree. It is true that the content of the
Iatrokles decree itself elsewhere implies a different view of the “benefits of
justice,” also falling far short of the radicalism of the Republic: in the later part
of the decree, Iatrokles is praised for preferring praise to money.122 This remark
makes primary the social benefits of justice in honor and recognition, rather than
its psychological reward, a good soul. The decree’s author could have meant to
imply a similarly limited view when he claimed that Iatrokles thought justice more
beneficial than injustice. However, there is no necessary discrepancy between the
position that virtue brings social rewards and a more radical Platonist eudaimo-
nism. Indeed, given the strength of the Platonic echo, the best conclusion is that
the decree’s author was committed to Plato’s view in the Republic that virtue
brings both psychological and social rewards.123
120. Morgan 2007: 5–8, 84–121.
121. I.Aeg.Thrace 11, ll. 8–14.
122. I.Mylasa 109, l. 22.
123. Cf. Pl. Rep. 612b6–614a4.
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Most other decrees that explicitly present virtue as beneficial for its possessor
draw attention to its social rewards in honor and renown. For example, Demetrios
of Alopeke was praised by the Athenians in 116/5 BC for seeking “good reputation”
(εὐφημία) among fellow citizens, rather than his narrower personal advantage.124
The fullest description of the social rewards of virtue occurs in the first decree of
Priene for Zosimos: Zosimos is described as “knowing that virtue alone brings the
greatest fruits and grateful recognition from [foreigners] and citizens who hold the
fine in honor” (συνιδὼν δ’ ὅτι μόνη μεγίστους ἀποδίδωσιν ἡ ἀρετὴ καρποὺς καὶ
χάριτας π[αρὰ ξένοις κ]αὶ̣ ἀστοῖς τὸ καλὸν ἐν τιμῇ θεμένοις).125
Significantly, virtue is here singled out as the only route to the greatest social
rewards, an approach consistent with the strong position, shared by different phil-
osophical schools, that virtue is necessary for happiness, such that the vicious man
cannot be happy, however wealthy and powerful he becomes. The singling out of
the life of virtue as a highly desirable aim is also attested in some other later
Hellenistic decrees. The Otorkondeis of Mylasa (compare the Iatrokles decree)
praised another benefactor for directing his life towards virtue, while their fellow
Mylasan phyle of the Konodorkondeis justified two sets of honors as means of
encouraging others to aspire to “the life directed towards virtue” (τὸν πρὸς
ἀρετὴν βί̣ον).126 If the restoration is correct, the later Hellenistic Andrians even
praised a group of benefactors who had fulfilled a public charge for having judged
the life of virtue to be the best (τ[̣ὸν πρὸς ἀρετὴν β]ίο̣ν ἄριστον κρίναντες εἶναι),127
presumably recognizing the superior benefits this life could offer, perhaps intrinsic
as well as extrinsic.
The lines of the Zosimos decree quoted above also have some more specific
affinities with philosophy. The reference to recognition gained among fellow
residents of Priene who “hold the fine in honor” represents a more sophisticated
articulation of the basic assumptions about virtue friendship and the polis,
strongly consistent with Aristotle’s philosophy, identified as implicit in the hon-
orary decree form itself in section 2 above. As represented in this decree, the citi-
zens and residents of Priene, who assign special importance to (“hold in honor”)
“the fine” (τὸ καλόν) in itself, resemble Aristotle’s true citizens, who recognize
that a polis exists for the sake of the good life, not merely for the sake of bare
life.128 Moreover, according to this representation, they also, like Aristotle’s true
citizens, scrutinize the behavior of their neighbors, forming substantial bonds
with those whom they recognize to be virtuous.129 In this light, a major benefit
124. IG II2 1009, ll. 44–45; cf. IG II2 1338 (Athens, after 86 BC), ll. 43–44. Compare also SEG
49.1041 (honorary decree for Protogenes of Olbia, c. 200 BC), face B, ll. 88–91.
125. I.Priene2 68, ll. 13–14. Compare I.Priene2 71 (new edition of I.Priene 117) (after 90 BC), ll.
59–60: Herakleitos’ προαίρεσις attracted the favorable judgment (διάληψις) of his fellow citizens.
126. I.Mylasa 118, l. 3; 119, ll. 5–6; 120, ll. 8–9.
127. IG XII Suppl. 253, l. 2.
128. Cf. Arist. Pol. 1252b27–30
129. Cf. Arist. Pol. 1280b1–6.
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of virtue is the opportunity to live in a cohesive, trusting, and mutually support-
ive community, held together by shared appreciation of virtue.130
Despite the predominance here of the social rewards of virtue, the reference to
the “fruits” of virtue as well as the gratitude it brings (καρποὺς καὶ χάριτας) may
imply an interest in its intrinsic psychological rewards: if “from foreigners and
city-dwellers” qualifies only χάριτας and not καρπούς, the latter can include the
“fruits” which spring directly from the seed of virtue. Interest in virtue’s intrinsic
psychological benefits is more unequivocally evident in the opening of another
Prienian decree, for Athenopolis, probably dating to c. 130 BC, which comes clos-
est to chiming with Aristotle’s version of the philosophical position that virtue is
necessary for happiness:
ἔδοξ[ε] τῆι βουλῆι· Λυκῖνος Λυκίνου εἶ̣πε[ν· ἐπειδὴ Ἀ]θηνόπολις Κυδίμου
ἀνὴρ καλὸς [καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὑ]πάρχω[ν] καὶ ἄξιος τῆς τῶν προγόνων ἀρε[τῆς
πρό]τερόν τε φιλάγαθον ἑαυτὸν παρεχόμενος ἐμ πᾶ[σιν ἔ]λαβεν παρὰ τοῦ
δήμου τιμάς, πολλὰ καὶ χρήσιμα τ[ῆι πόλ]ει συνκατασκευάσας διὰ τὴν
αὐτοῦ καλοκἀγαθ[ία]ν,̣ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα μένων ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς προθέσεως
οὐδ[ενὸ]ς ἀφίσταται τῶν τῶι δήμωι συμφερόντων, καὶ λέγων κ[αὶ πρ]-
άσσων τὰ ἄριστα οὑδεμιᾶς λειπόμενος φιλαγαθίας, ἄξι[ον ἑα]υτὸν
παρεχόμενος τῶν προδεδομένων αὐτῶι τιμῶν ̣ [καὶ ο]ὐκ ἐπιλανθανόμενος
τῶν προειρημένων, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλο[̣ν συ]ντηρῶν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας
εὔνοιαν, νομίζων το[ῦτο α]ὑτῶι μέγιστον ὑπάρχειν τὸ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς
συνα̣ν̣αστρ[ε]φο̣[̣μέν]ους ἐκτένειαν συντηρεῖν, ὅθεν ἐν οὐθενὶ λειπομένου
α[̣ὐτο]ῦ,̣ προσεπαύξοντος δὲ τὴν κατὰ τὸ κάλλιστον προθυ[μίαν,] καθῆκον
δέ ἐστιν καὶ ἄξιον τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς φ[ιλαγαθίας] ταύτης τυχεῖν τῆς τιμῆς
[. . . . . . . . . . . . .]ης̣.̣
Resolved by the council. Lykinos, son of Lykinos, proposed. These are the
reasons for the honors: Athenopolis, son of Kydimos, is a fine and noble
man and worthy of his ancestors’ virtue. Offering himself as a lover of
the good in all things, he previously received honors from the people, after
procuring many useful things for the city through his fine and noble charac-
ter. After this, maintaining the same disposition, he has not deviated from
any of the things beneficial for the people, saying and doing the best things,
not falling short of any love of the good. He has made himself worthy of the
honors previously given to him and has not forgotten his promises. On the
contrary, he has maintained his good will towards the citizens, thinking that
what belongs to himself most of all is the maintenance of striving on behalf
of those conducting their lives together with him. As a result, he has not
been found wanting in any respect, but has rather increased his enthusiasm
130. For an account ascribing to Aristotle the view that mutual support among members of a
community committed to virtue is crucial for individuals’ development both of virtuous habits and
of an intellectual understanding of virtue, see Cooper 2010.
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aligned with what is most fine. It is therefore appropriate and worthy of the
man’s love of the good that Athenopolis should receive these honors.131
The abstract opening description of Athenopolis’ virtues thus builds up to the claim
that Athenopolis thought that what belonged to him most of all was the maintenance
of striving on behalf of those with whom he shared a common life. Significantly,
ὑπάρχειν with the dative is usually used in honorary decrees of Priene, as in those
of other poleis, to describe the grant of concrete privileges: “let him possess”
(ὑπάρχειν αὐτῶι) certain privileges.132 The drafter of the decree for Athenopolis
thus pointedly made clear that Athenopolis was more interested in intangible
“possessions.”133
Indeed, according to the description in these lines, Athenopolis regarded his
virtuous behavior for the benefit of fellow citizens as his most significant attribute:
the thing most fundamental to his essence. This attitude strongly recalls the central
eudaimonist conviction, shared by different philosophical schools, that to be virtuous
is to fulfill one’s nature as a man. In particular, the decree’s identification of assidu-
ousness (ἐκτένεια) as essential to Athenopolis’ nature recalls Aristotle’s famous
identification of the “human good,” the thing most proper to a human being, as
“activity of the soul in accordance with virtue” (ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετήν).134
Admittedly, ἐκτένεια is quite a different concept from ἐνέργεια, but it would have
been the best available word within the common repertoire of epigraphic virtues to
convey energetic striving to act on behalf of fellow citizens. It is also true that the lead-
ing second-century BC Peripatetic Critolaus had turned away from the distinctive
Aristotelian focus on activity, preferring to analyze the good life in terms of the com-
pleteness that comes from possession of different goods.135 Nonetheless, Aristotle’s
own approach would have remained accessible, and certainly remained a viable alter-
native: Critolaus’ revisionist approach was to come under strong attack, for neglecting
activity, in the first century BC and AD.136
A further strong sign of abstract ethical reflection in the Athenopolis decree
is the claim that Athenopolis’ striving was directed towards those with whom he
shared a common life (τοὺς συνα̣ν̣αστρ[ε]φο̣[̣μέν]ους):137 the beneficiaries of his
euergetism were not blandly identified as his fellow citizens or residents, but as
those whose lives were entwined with his. This suggests an awareness of the
131. I.Priene2 63 (new edition of I.Priene 107), ll. 8–24.
132. E.g., I.Priene2 18 (new edition of I.Priene 7), ll. 20–1; I.Priene2 71, l. 69; I.Priene2 107
(new edition of I.Priene 8), ll. 37–8.
133. Compare the related, but less striking, claim in the first-century BC Prienian decree for
Herakleitos that he recognized that it was proper for himself to make a start with a certain kind of civic
activity (the text is fragmentary) (γινώσκων τ[. . . . . . . . . . . . . .πρ]έπ̣ον μὲν εἶναι ἑαυτῶι καταρχὴν
ποιήσασθαι τῆς εἰς [. . .. . .]) (I.Priene2 71, ll. 37–8).
134. Arist. EN 1098a7–18.
135. Sharples 2010: chapter 18, texts H and I.
136. See Inwood 2014: 55–58, 68–70, identifying Staseas of Naples as a possible initiator of the
first-century BC counter-reaction against Critolaus’ position.
137. On this word, see also Wilhelm 1907: 18.
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interdependence of different members of the polis. It also strongly recalls
Aristotle’s eudaimonist argumentation. In Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics,
for example, Aristotle claims that the virtuous man cannot achieve εὐδαιμονία
merely by engaging in intellectual contemplation: as a human being, who natu-
rally lives together with multiple others, the virtuous man chooses also to act
in accordance with virtue (ᾗ δ’ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι συζῇ, αἱρεῖται τὰ
κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν πράττειν).138 This is another of the rare cases where a decree’s
overlap with a philosopher’s doctrines in itself suggests philosophical inspiration.
The conviction that virtue is good for the virtuous agent—or even necessary for
his happiness—might be thought to be restricted to the isolated cases mentioned, in
such a way that it cannot be used as evidence for a more wide-ranging tendency
towards ethical reflection. However, although it is rarely made explicit, a eudaimo-
nist attitude strongly convergent with Aristotle’s arguably underlies most of the long
honorary decrees for citizens of the later Hellenistic period. The drafters of such
decrees generally implied through their elaborate, multifaceted presentations of the
life stories of elite benefactors that a life of sustained virtuous action is highly desir-
able, because personally fulfilling and apt to satisfy diverse human needs.139 Indeed,
it is likely that a detailed account of the rich, well-ordered life of a virtuous benefac-
tor, engaged in social, political, intellectual, and cultural life, would usually have
been more effective than any shorter rational argument as a means of advocating this
ethical outlook. As Aristotle himself says in the Rhetoric, praise and advice share a
“common form.”140
In a way consistent with this general tendency, longer later Hellenistic honorary
decrees commonly contain a feature that recalls a specific aspect of Aristotle’s eudai-
monistic emphasis on the importance of sustained virtuous action: many such
decrees emphasize the fact that honorands maintained virtuous states of character,
and corresponding motivations and actions, quite literally throughout their lives.141
Indeed, it was commonly thought appropriate that such lifelong virtue should be
demonstrated “from earliest youth” (ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡλικίας).142 This aspect of hon-
orific rhetoric can be compared with Aristotle’s insistence that true fulfillment
(εὐδαιμονία) consists of activity in accordance with virtue “in a complete life”
(ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ).143 It is also consistent with Aristotle’s insistence that habituation
and education in virtue should begin at the youngest possible age.144
To sum up, a significant number of later Hellenistic honorary decrees explicitly
or implicitly promote a broad eudaimonist approach to ethics, not very common in
138. Arist. EN 1178b5–6.
139. Compare Dreyer 2010: 353.
140. Arist. Rh. 1367b37–1368a1.
141. Compare Dreyer 2010: 353–54. See for example, I.Metropolis 1, face A, ll. 12–13; I.Mylasa
118, l. 4.
142. E.g., I.Metropolis 1, face B, l. 5. On this phenomenon, see Kleijwegt 1991: esp. 234–35.
143. Arist. EN 1098a16. For Hellenistic Peripatetic commitment to this view, compare Tsouni
2018, text, sec. 13 Ts, 130.15–21 (also Sharples 2010, chapter 15, text A, section 16).
144. E.g., Arist. EN 1104b11–13.
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Greek non-philosophical sources but shared with Platonists and Aristotelians by the
Stoics. However, the drafters of relevant decrees expressed this approach using
phrasing and emphases more reminiscent of Aristotle and the Peripatetics than of
the Stoics. For them, a fulfilling life consisted less in a state of wisdom than in sus-
tained virtuous activity and meaningful, supportive social relationships.
C ) I F V I R TUE DOE S NECE S S AR I LY B ENEF I T I T S P O S S E S S OR , ARE
BOD I LY AND EXTERNAL GOOD S AL S O NECE S S ARY FOR
HAP P I N E S S ?
Also in line with Aristotelian rather than Stoic ideas, most relevant decrees gave
prominence to bodily health and material wealth, alongside virtue, as important com-
ponents of honorands’ admirable, desirable lives. Aristotle had maintained that
bodily and “external goods” are necessary for happiness (εὐδαιμονία), in addition
to virtue.145 The Hellenistic Peripatetics preserved and refined this approach,146 ana-
lyzing closely the nature and relationship of different types of goods.147 Indeed, the
issue of whether bodily and external goods are necessary for happiness became
(alongside the controversy over the moral status of the emotions) a principal dividing
line between Peripatetics and Stoics.148 In stark opposition to the Aristotelian and
Peripatetic position, the Stoics claimed that it is possible for a virtuous man to be
“fulfilled” (εὐδαίμων) without anything more than a virtuous soul, because virtue
is the only true good.149
Decrees’ convergence with the Aristotelian and Peripatetic position on this
issue might appear commonsensical, but the fact that contemporary Stoics strongly
questioned their approach shows that this was, in fact, a live and potentially conten-
tious issue. Furthermore, many relevant decree-drafters expressed the importance of
bodily and external goods in rhetoric strongly reminiscent of fourth-century ethical
works, including Aristotle’s, and the ensuing Hellenistic tradition. For example, the
rhetoric of some texts appeals to the traditional Greek ideal, prominent in the fourth
century,150 that well-being requires the safety and flourishing of both body (σῶμα)
and soul (ψυχή). In an honorary decree of Peloponnesian Antigoneia/Mantineia
dating to Augustus’ early reign,151 the marriage of the honorand, Euphrosynos, to
his wife, Epigone, was described as a joining of souls and indivisible concord, on
145. Arist. EN 1101a14–16. Cf. Irwin 2007: 123–32, 143–45.
146. See Tsouni 2018, text, secs. 6–8 Ts, 124.16–127.3; sec. 15 Ts., 136.10–16 (also Sharples
2010: chapter 15, text A, sections 9–11, 24). See also Sharples 2010: chapter 1, text X; chapter 18,
passim.
147. See, for example, Inwood 2014: 54–55 on Critolaus’ development of this aspect of
Aristotelianism, in dialogue with Stoic approaches.
148. Sharples 2010: 166.
149. Cicero advocates this Stoic view at Off. 3.20 and includes criticism of it at Fin. 4.27, 72–73.
Finkelberg (2002: 35–49) thinks that this type of approach was prevalent in Hellenistic ethical thought
as a whole.
150. E.g., Lysias 2.15.
151. On the dating, see van Bremen 1996: 140.
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the one hand, with material estates and bodies, on the other: ἐζεύγνυντο γὰρ βιό[τοι]ς
[κ]αὶ σώμασιν ψυχαὶ καὶ παρ’ ἀμφοτέροις ἀμέρι[στος ὁ]μό̣νοια.152 The desirable
shared life of husband and wife was thus represented as involving an integration of
intangible spiritual goods with material and bodily goods.153
Similarly, it is a recurring theme of the long Colophonian decree for
Polemaios (later second century BC) that Polemaios harmoniously harnessed
bodily goods, material wealth, and goods of the soul in living an enviable life
of civic virtue. The opening of the decree, concerning Polemaios’ activities in
the gymnasium, is strongly convergent with the traditional emphasis in Greek
educational thought on simultaneous development of both body (σῶμα) and soul
(ψυχή), which found influential fourth-century expression in Isocrates’ educa-
tional theory.154 It is commented that Polemaios “nourished his soul with the fin-
est learning” (τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν τοῖς καλλίστοις συντρέφων μαθήμασιν), but also
“trained his body through the habitual activities of the gymnasia” (τὸ δὲ σῶμα
τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν γυμνασιῶν ἐθισμοῖς ἐναθλήσας).155 As a result of his preparation
in the gymnasium, he was victorious in sacred games. Wishing to make all fellow
Colophonians on equal terms from the first sharers in his choice (προαίρεσις) of
life (πάντας ὁμοίως σπεύδων ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς κοινωνοὺς ποιήσασθαι τῆς τοῦ βίου
προαιρέσεως), he then provided hospitality for all. This is described as a case
of Polemaios making “a distribution of the material resources resulting from
his life(style)”: μετάδοσιν ἐποιήσατο τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ βίου χορηγίας.156 According to
this presentation, Polemaios’ training of his body yielded deserved material rewards,
which he partially redistributed to fellow citizens, showing the ethical qualities of the
soul which he had “nourished with learning”; he enjoyed a fine bios in both the
material and the ethical sense (livelihood/life), with the two closely interconnected.
The rhetorical dichotomy between bodily and external goods, on the one hand,
and goods of the soul, on the other, is preserved in the narration of Polemaios’ subse-
quent visit to Rhodes. He went to study with advanced teachers in Rhodes, “thinking
fine not only the prestige accruing to his life and his country from his bodily attributes,
but also that which comes from taking charge of common affairs through speech and
political action” (καλὸν δὲ κρίνων οὐ μόνον τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος περιγινόμενον τῶι
βίωι καὶ τῆι πατρίδι κόσμον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ προίστασθαι τῶν κοινῶν λόγωι καὶ
πράξει πολιτικῇ).157 In other words, Polemaios continued to recognize the value of
152. IG V 2 268, ll. 32–34; the restoration βιό[τοι]ς (suggested by von Premerstein and skepti-
cally reported in the addenda and corrigenda to IG V 2, p. 146) is preferable to IG’s restoration βίοι
[βίοι]ς, because the latter leaves καὶ παρ’ ἀμφοτέροις ἀμέρι[στος ὁ]μό̣νοια without a corresponding
dative, and thus with no connection to the rest of the sentence. The restoration βιό[τοι]ς plausibly
makes the sentence into a description of the yoking of two pairs.
153. On this image of marital harmony, see van Bremen 1996: 139–40.
154. E.g., Isoc. 1.9, 12; 9.23–24; 15.181–82. On the emphasis of this and other decrees on the
nurturing of the benefactor’s body and his soul: Dreyer 2004: 217.
155. For idealization of this kind of education in the gymnasium, compare I.Ephesos 6, ll. 15–19.
156. SEG 39.1243, col. I, ll. 1–16.
157. SEG 39.1243, col. I, ll. 16–46, quotation from 16–22.
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virtuous action, as well as that of physical prowess and its rewards. Although
Polemaios’ blend of worldly and intangible goods ceases to be a guiding rhetorical
thread of the decree after this point, it is later commented that he participated in diplo-
macy, “putting on the line for the people his body, soul, and whole livelihood”
(σώματι κ<αὶ τ>ῆι ψυχῆι καὶ τῶι παντὶ βίωι περὶ τοῦ δήμου παραβαλλόμενος).158
While the general tone of these varied parts of the account of Polemaios’ life con-
sistently evokes Aristotle’s approach to external goods and happiness, the closest par-
allel to Aristotle’s own language occurs in another context: the decree’s description of
the impression of the city of Colophon gained by those who attended the festival of the
Claria, in whose organization Polemaios played a leading role. According to that
description, the foreigners who attended the festival recognized and reported the
“excellence and resources of the city” (τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ χορηγίαν αὐτῆς).159 This jux-
taposition of excellence (ἀρετή)160 and resources (χορηγία) as praiseworthy attributes
of the city recalls Aristotle’s standard formula for the good life of a man: “what pre-
vents that man being called fulfilled who acts in accordance with complete virtue
(ἀρετή) and is sufficiently equipped (κεχορηγημένον) with external goods?”161
Interestingly, Aristotle himself extended this argument to whole poleis as well
as individuals: the best life for both individuals and whole poleis is that of virtue
endowed with sufficient material goods for participating in virtuous action (ὁ
μετ’ ἀρετῆς κεχορηγημένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ’ ἀρετὴν
πράξεων).162 Through a type of city-soul analogy shared with Aristotle himself,
the drafter of the decree for Polemaios thus showed that Colophon was completely
unlike the dystopia conjured up by the name of the neighboring “Polis of Slaves”
(Δούλων Πόλις) mentioned elsewhere in the decree as the site of raiding,163 which
corresponds to Aristotle’s own notion of the antithesis of a true polis.164 According
to the decree, the Colophonian polis, like Polemaios himself, had demonstrably
satisfied Aristotle’s requirements for εὐδαιμονία.
D ) I F BOD I LY AND EXTERNAL GOOD S DO CONTR I BUT E TO THE GOOD
L I F E , HOW DO THEY CONTR I BUT E TO I T ?
Certain later Hellenistic decrees also converged with Aristotelian thinking in
their explorations of the precise nature of the contribution of bodily and external
158. SEG 39.1243, col. II, ll. 22–24.
159. SEG 39.1243, col. V, l. 10. The use of the word χορηγία in col. I, l. 16 (compare also col. II,
ll. 9–10), counts against translating it as “largesse” (Robert and Robert 1989: 55) rather than
“resources” here.
160. The drafter could have had the physical excellence of the city in mind, but the parallel with
Aristotle suggests that the phrasing also evoked moral excellence.
161. Arist. EN 1101a14–16; compare 1099a32–33.
162. Arist. Pol. 1323b40 –1324a2.
163. SEG 39.1243, col. II, ll. 33–51, with Robert and Robert 1989: 37–38 and now Rigsby 2005:
esp. 112–15, discussing intermediate bibliography.
164. Aristotle Politics 1280a32–34. On the comparison with this decree: Dubois 2006: 8–9;
2007: 440–42.
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goods to the good life of the generous citizen. In addition to presenting bodily and
external goods as necessary for εὐδαιμονία, Aristotle had offered detailed accounts
of their role in the fulfilled life. He accepted that such goods can make a direct
contribution to an individual’s well-being: they are not desirable simply as instru-
mental means to fulfilling types of activity.165 However, as already evident in the
closing part of the last section, Aristotle also emphasized that external goods are
indispensable for virtuous activity. A basic level of wealth and other external goods
is necessary for an agent to follow any consistent, considered course of action.
Moreover, the scope and influence of an agent’s virtuous activities is greatly
increased if he can make use of “tools, friends, wealth, and political power.”166
Hellenistic Peripatetics preserved and developed Aristotle’s approach, acknowledg-
ing the value of bodily and external goods both in themselves and as means to vir-
tuous activity. One Peripatetic way of approaching the issue was to argue that wealth
and office are good when in the hands of those with the virtue to make good use of
them.167
Similar attitudes to bodily and external goods are paralleled in the Colophonian
decree for Polemaios. The view that bodily prowess is desirable, both for its own sake
and for the recognition it brings, is implied in that decree’s reference to the “prestige”
(κόσμος) accruing to Polemaios’ life, as well as to his city, from the state of his
body.168 More pervasive in the decree is an implied commitment to the view that
external goods have instrumental value as a means to virtue: Polemaios’ wealth
enabled him to behave as a virtuous and effective civic benefactor. Indeed, the decree
uses three times a very common epigraphic formula which encapsulates this attitude:
Polemaios performed particular benevolent services or public functions “from his own
resources” (ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων).169 The pervasive application of this formula to civic bene-
factors’ services in Hellenistic decrees implies that wealth was widely regarded as a
substantial aid to virtuous activity, or even one of its prerequisites.
The Colophonian example might suggest that such quasi-Peripatetic emphasis
on the close entwining of wealth, virtue, and the good life served aristocratic or oli-
garchic purposes: this approach could be used to imply that only those endowed
with sufficient material resources could exercise true virtue and live a truly good life.
Skinner shows that explicit readings of Aristotle along these lines were used to sup-
port oligarchy in Medieval Italy.170 Doubtless some wealthy later Hellenistic bene-
factors supported and advanced such arguments in order to entrench their power and
privileges. But they could not do so unchallenged: the demos and supporters of civic
community insisted, not least through honorary decrees, that the common good
should dictate what constituted desirable, virtuous use of wealth.
165. E.g., Arist. EN 1100b26–28; 1123a6–7. Compare Irwin 1999: 189.
166. Arist. EN 1098b33–1099b2.
167. See Tsouni 2018, text, sec. 7 Ts, 125.10–23; sec. 15 Ts., 135.19–136.8 (also Sharples 2010,
chapter 15, text A, sections 10 and 23).
168. SEG 39.1243, col. I, ll. 17–19.
169. SEG 39.1243, col. II, ll. 9–11; col. III, l. 12; col. IV, l. 23.
170. Skinner 2002: 133.
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In the Politics, Aristotle himself applies his principle that external goods are
indispensable aids to virtuous activity in a distinctively political way. In objecting
to Plato’s advocacy of a form of communism in the Republic, Aristotle argues that
the best civic arrangement would be the following. Individual citizens should be
allowed to possess private property, of which they will be induced to take good
care by self-interest and personal pride. It should be left to the informal constraints
of virtue and civic friendship to encourage them to deploy their private property
for the public good, or the good of particular fellow citizens, in times of need. If
properly inculcated in citizens, virtue and civic friendship will lead them to regard
their formally private property as in some respects “common.” This theory is sum-
marized in the following formula:
φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἰδίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει
ποιεῖν κοινάς·171
So it is clearly better that property should be private, but to make it com-
mon in use.
Aristotle presumably thought this arrangement superior partly for purely pragmatic
reasons: it is a way of sublimating individuals’ self-interest for the common good.
Nevertheless, as Kraut points out, Aristotle also had a more idealistic reason for
favoring this arrangement: possession of private property makes it possible for
citizens to make their own personal contributions to the common good, virtuous
benefactions from which they can derive personal pride and fulfillment.172
This aspect of Aristotle’s philosophy of property is closely echoed in the later
second-century BC Prienian decree for Moschion. The relevant section concerns
Moschion’s contributions of money to the city in a financial crisis:
ἐπὶ δὲ στεφα[ν]ηφόρου Κέκροπος οὐ μόνον διαφόρων γενομένης τῆι
[π]όλει χρείας, ἀ[̣λλὰ] καὶ παραστάσεως ἐνεχύρων, διαλαβ[ὼν κ]οινὴν εἶναι
τὴ̣[̣ν] οὐσίαν πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τ[. . . . . . . .δι]αν̣ομ̣ῶ[̣..]ω[.]ο[̣..]?
[(whole line missing). . .οὐδενὸς ὑστ]ε[ρ]οῦντα καὶ τοῦτον ἐν ταῖς εἰς τὰ
κοινὰ [χρείαις προ]εἰσήνεγκε διαφόρου μὲν δραχμὰς Ἀλε[ξ]α[̣ν]δρε[ίας
χιλίας, εἰ]ς δὲ χρῆσιν ἐνεχύρων ἀργυρώματα δραχμῶν [Ἀλεξανδρεί]ων
τετρακισχιλίων·
In the stephanephorate of Kekrops, when the polis needed not only capital
but also the provision of sureties, Moschion, treating his property as com-
mon to all citizens, and. . . . . . . . . . . .distributions (?). . .[whole line miss-
ing]. . . inferior to no one in times of need concerning the common good,
donated 1000 Alexander-drachmas as capital and silver plate worth 4000
Alexander-drachmas for use as sureties.173
171. Arist. Pol. 1263a21–39 (ll. 37–39 for the quotation).
172. Kraut 2002: 337.
173. I.Priene2 64, ll. 89–97; compare Veyne 1976: 237–38.
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The unusual description of Moschion treating his property as common to all citizens
(διαλαβ[ὼν κ]οινὴν εἶναι τὴ̣[̣ν] οὐσίαν πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν) assimilates him to
Aristotle’s virtuous citizen. He possessed considerable private wealth, which he
doubtless took care to preserve and increase.174 However, in a moment of civic cri-
sis, he “treated” it as common to all citizens, and thus effectively as, in Aristotle’s
phrase, “common in use” (τῇ δὲ χρήσει κοινή).
It might be objected that this is, in fact, a fairly bland description of the result of
Moschion’s action, appropriate to the behavior of any generous citizen. Alternatively,
it might be objected that the text simply describes the particular pragmatic result of
providing sureties for the polis: the relevant property became, in a way, both private
and common. There are, however, strong reasons for thinking that this claim is distinc-
tive and even philosophical. The clause about his property being common is placed
early in the account, to explain the motivation of Moschion’s action (note the choice
of verb, διαλαβών). It is not placed at the end, to describe the result of his action (in
which case a verb of “making” or “rendering” would have been needed). Whereas
the typical benefactor gave up his private property for public purposes, alienating what
was truly his, and a civic creditor could render his own personal property in a way
“common” by offering it as surety, Moschion treated his property as if it was already
simultaneously “private” and “common” in the first place. In this case, therefore, the
Aristotelian echo is sufficiently distinctive and strong to suspect the direct influence of
Aristotle’s Politics or of a derivative work.
A similar notion of the good citizen’s use of, and attitude to, his private property is
also at least implicit in other later Hellenistic decrees in which there is no evidence of
direct Aristotelian influence. This is true, in particular, of the decree of Antigoneia/
Mantineia for Euphrosynos, shown above to express the ideal of integration of spiri-
tual and worldly goods in the good life. Early in that decree, Euphrosynos is praised
for offering bricks which had been prepared for his own use (εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν
εὐχρηστίαν ἡτοι̣μασμένας) for the rebuilding of part of the civic gymnasium, which
had been destroyed by fire. He did so “judging the public appearance of the city more
important than his own domestic convenience” (τῆς κατ’ οἶκον ὠ[̣φε]λίας τὸν
δημόσιον κόσμον προκρείνας).175 Like Moschion, therefore, Euphrosynos possessed
considerable private resources, but devoted them to public projects in a time of crisis.
More generally, the same attitude to private property is evident in the way many later
Hellenistic decrees, especially Prienian ones, praise wealthy benefactors’ use of their
homes for the quasi-public entertainment of fellow citizens.176
It was not necessarily only those material goods that wealthy and successful
individuals had obtained by their own talent and efforts which Hellenistic Greeks
considered it quite legitimate for them to retain, provided that they ploughed them
back into projects of communal benefit. Indeed, in c. 154 BC, a corporate group
174. Compare Thonemann 2011: 249–50.
175. IG V 2 268, ll. 18–21.
176. See Schmitt-Pantel 1992: 262–63, 346, 372–73; Wörrle 1995: 244–45; van Bremen 1996:
156–70.
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of soldiers sent to Alexandria by the Cretan federation (κοινόν) praised Aglaos of
Cos for judging it best to use for the good of his fellow men not only those “advan-
tages” (προτερήματα) which he obtained as a result of his own virtue (ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας
ἀρετῆς), but also those which he obtained through “chance” (ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης).177 The
word τύχη could, admittedly, have many different meanings in Hellenistic Greek,
but the clear opposition with ἀρετή here strongly implies a subtle distinction, of
the kind a philosopher would make, between earned and unearned advantages.
There was no criticism of Aglaos’ accumulation of resources through mere chance
rather than desert: on the contrary, Aglaos was praised for considering resources
obtained in that way to be best used for communal ends. This example was very
far from any egalitarian aspiration to material equality, or even to the elimination
of the effects of luck on individuals’material welfare. Nonetheless, there was a clear
common conviction, shared by benefactor and community, that the value of wealth
lies mainly in enabling benefactions for the common good.
E ) I S I T N EC E S S ARY TO BE A GOOD C I T I Z EN OF A POL I S I N ORDER
TO L I V E A V I R TUOU S L I F E ?
It is an unsurprising result that later Hellenistic decree-drafters continued
to endorse the view, consistent with Aristotle’s Politics178 and its Hellenistic
Peripatetic followers,179 that citizenship in a polis is a prerequisite for living a vir-
tuous life.180 Conversely, later Hellenistic decree-drafters tended to show only lim-
ited sympathy with the contrasting view, promoted by the Stoics, that the virtuous
man’s most ethically important membership is his participation in a universal com-
munity of all men or all rational, virtuous beings, not citizenship of some particular
polis.181 It is important to stress that the Stoics were certainly not uninterested in the
local polis as a valuable stage for virtuous activity.182 Nonetheless, unlike Aristotle,
the Peripatetics, and most civic decrees, the Stoics tended to bestow more impor-
tance and attention on other types of social and political engagement, including both
commitment to the cosmopolis and efforts to transform individual souls in ways
that, if generalized, would revolutionize society.183
177. ID 1517, ll. 27–30.
178. For a recent treatment: Cooper 2010.
179. For a Peripatetic argument that the good man will choose to participate in politics, see
Tsouni 2018, text, sec. 23 Ts, 144.20–22; compare sec. 27 Ts (also Sharples 2010, chapter 15, text
A, section 40, 45–52).
180. For example, Menas of Sestos was praised for making everything else secondary to the main-
tenance of a genuine, energetic commitment to his polis (I.Sestos 1, ll. 4–7). Compare also the tone of the
rest of the account of Menas’ civic contributions (ll. 5–86). In this and other decrees, civic engagement is
more than merely “an important component” (Dreyer 2010: 353) of the virtuous life.
181. Irwin 2007: 356–57. For more detailed treatment, see, for example, Erskine 1990: e.g.,
19–27; Schofield 1999b: chs. 3–4; Murray 2004.
182. Compare Schofield 2003: 254.
183. See Long 2006: 12–13.
218 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 37/No. 2/October 2018
Even if this first result is predictable, it is revealing that several later Hellenistic
decree-drafters added complexity and detail to their articulation of this central civic
conviction in ways that were significantly convergent with the approach of Aristotle
and the Peripatetics. First, as I argue in another article,184 some decree-drafters used
language and ideas strongly consonant with Aristotle’s to present the polis as the most
suitable context for the acquisition of virtue by individuals, through education.185
According to relevant decrees, the polis provides the ideal context for ongoing educa-
tion which shapes the character of citizens, including their emotional dispositions,
through practical habituation as well as intellectual instruction; the honorific process
is also presented as itself crucial to this civic education.186 In these cases, the conver-
gence with Aristotelian thought is so strong that the influence of Aristotelian or
Peripatetic texts is likely.187
Second, some later Hellenistic decree-drafters employed language and ideas
strongly consistent with Aristotle’s to present the polis as the primary arena for
the exercise of virtue, once its basic rudiments have been acquired. The second-
century BC Metropolitan decree for Apollonios offers a reason why the good man
should dedicate himself to his city: it was “appropriate” (καθῆκον) for Apollonios
as an excellent and goodman (ἀνδρὶ καλῶι καὶ ἀγαθῶι) to be “a protector and helper
of his city.”188 The suggestion that such behavior is καθῆκον for a virtuous man
implies not only that it is incumbent on the virtuous man to contribute to his polis,
but also that his polis provides a “fitting” stage for him to exercise his virtue: as
Aristotle would have put it, man is a “political animal” who needs a polis in which
to behave virtuously.
A later Hellenistic decree-drafter could also offer a distinctively Aristotelian-
style image of the kinds of virtuous activity made possible by civic participation.
In the Colophonian decree for Polemaios, it is commented that Polemaios
assumed responsibility for sacred contests, “thinking that this responsibility would
bring glory to his fatherland equal to that of other (responsibilities)” (διαλαβὼν
τα<ύ>τη<ν> μὲν χρείαν ἴσην οἴ<σ>ειν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῆι πατρίδι δόξαν).189 This
remark has the almost polemical implication that religious and cultural activities
of this type are as important and valuable as the more directly political types of
civic activity described elsewhere in the decree, especially diplomatic activity.
This approach is consistent with Aristotle’s insistence that a true, complete polis
does not merely possess institutions designed to enable and regulate citizens’
184. Gray 2013a.
185. For Aristotle’s emphasis on the educational role of a true polis, see especially Arist. Pol.
1263b36–37.
186. See especially I.Sestos 1, ll. 70–72; I.Priene2 68, ll. 74–77; I.Iasos 98, ll. 1–19.
187. For example, for Aristotelian interest in habituation, see Arist. EN 1105a17–1105b18; Arist.
EN 1179b4–10. See also Burnyeat 1980; Sorabji 1980; Charles 1984: 180, 182. For the persistence
and development of this approach in Hellenistic Peripatetic philosophy, see, for example, Tsouni
2018, text, sec. 1 Ts, 116.19–117.7 (also Sharples 2010, chapter 15, text A, section 1).
188. I.Metropolis 1, face A, ll. 8–9.
189. SEG 39.1243, col. IV, ll. 35–40.
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secure, peaceful coexistence, but offers the full range of activities that are condu-
cive to the development of its citizens as virtuous men.190
It would be wrong, however, to imply that later Hellenistic decrees systematically
downplayed relationships above or below the level of the polis of fellow citizens.
In reaction to the ever more interconnected social conditions and intellectual environ-
ment of the contemporary Mediterranean, drafters of later Hellenistic decrees engaged
in a project similar to that of some contemporary Peripatetics: revising traditional civic
values and virtues themselves to accommodate more cosmopolitan and cross-border
relationships. This seems to have been a hallmark of later Hellenistic Peripatetic
political philosophy, reflecting close dialogue with Stoicism; it is evident in both
Piso’s speech in Book V of Cicero’s De Finibus and in the summary of Peripatetic
ethics attributed to Arius Didymus.191 Along similar lines, in the later Hellenistic
period civic decrees began to incorporate the universalistic virtue of “humanity”
(φιλανθρωπία) into their picture of the good citizen’s attributes, using that term to
describe good relations not only between citizens and strangers, but even between fel-
low citizens of the same polis.192
Both active citizens and philosophers were also reflecting simultaneously in the
later Hellenistic world on the nature of the complex fabric of relations that make up a
polis, as well as on the place of the polis in the wider human community. Building
on Aristotle’s ideas, later Hellenistic Peripatetics stressed that an individual’s rela-
tions with his fellow citizens represent only one—even if a particularly important
one—of several important, overlapping circles of ethical relationships within the
polis. The summary of Peripatetic ethics attributed to Arius Didymus discusses love
of children, brothers, parents, wives, relations, associates, and neighbors alongside
love of country and fellow citizens. These internal relationships within a polis are
complementary types of natural human attachment, of which other types extend to
larger ethnic groups and even to the whole of humanity.193 This kind of explicit
adumbration of multiple circles of ethical relationships seems to have been a wider
tendency of later Hellenistic philosophy: Cicero also attempts it in De Officiis,
almost certainly drawing on Panaetius’ work.194 This approach was also paralleled
in contemporary epigraphy: for example, the decree of Priene for Moschion at one
point distinguishes the virtues he showed in relations with his parents, with “those
living together with him in close relations and intimacy” (τοὺ[ς συμ]β[ι]οῦντας ἐν
οἰκ[ε]ιότηιτι καὶ χρήσε̣ι), and with the rest of the citizens.195
Exploration of the complexities of civic social life must have been a crucial
means for poleis’ citizens to investigate how to sustain civic community and
190. See Arist. Pol. 1252b27–30.
191. Compare Annas 1995; Schofield 2012: esp. 179–81. See especially Tsouni 2018, text, sec. 3
Ts, 120.9–121.23 (also Sharples 2010, chapter 15, text A, section 4).
192. Hamon 2012; Gray 2013b.
193. Tsouni 2018, text, sec. 3 Ts, 120.9–121.3; sec. 9 Ts, 127.3–14 (also Sharples 2010, chapter 15,
text A, sections 4 and 12).
194. Cicero Off. 1.50–58, esp. 53; Wiemer 2016: esp. 14.
195. I.Priene2 64, new edition of I.Priene 108, ll. 16–18.
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benefaction in the changed conditions of later Hellenistic times. The stress on
the indispensable role of polis citizenship in the good life could have helped
to persuade the mobile wealthy to show dedication to their polis. One relevant
line of argument deployed in decrees was that successful citizens were obliged
to repay the contribution made by their poleis to their success. For example, both
Polemaios of Colophon and the first-century BC leading Pergamene benefactor,
Diodoros Pasparos, were praised for withstanding hardships for the sake of “the
territory which had nurtured them” (τὸ θρέψαν ἐδάφος).196 According to this
approach, citizens were bound by principles of reciprocity and gratitude to
remain faithful to the poleis which had nurtured them. Like most of the other
later Hellenistic rhetoric considered here, this notion echoes Classical Athenian
ideas, found in tragedy and oratory as well as philosophy.197
In a greater number of cases, however, later Hellenistic honorary decrees sought
to persuade the wealthy to show civic commitment by another means. This was the
result of the common juxtaposition, clear in the long Colophonian, Sestian, and
Prienian decrees, of the polis-centered approach discussed in this sub-section with
the eudaimonistic approach studied in sub-section 3c above. Placed alongside each
other, these two approaches amounted to the conviction that engaged polis citizen-
ship is the best route to the individual fulfillment that comes through a flourishing
life and soul.198
This was a distinctive feature of later Hellenistic decrees, which marked them
out from earlier Hellenistic predecessors. For example, both the third-century BC
Athenian decree for Phaidros of Sphettos199 and the later second-century BC
Colophonian decree for Polemaios give a central role to the home polis as the con-
text of their respective honorands’ virtuous activity. However, the second-century
decree, unlike the third-century decree, offers both great detail about Polemaios’
own education and early development and a highly personalized account of his
later life, including his role in his own household and family.200 Polemaios’ per-
sonal development and welfare were thus presented as intimate concerns of the
Colophonians as a whole, as well as consequences of his citizen lifestyle.
According to this general approach, it is obvious why all citizens should com-
mit themselves wholeheartedly to their poleis. In the first century BC, the citizens
of Sagalassos in Pisidia honored Manesas of Termessos for coming to their aid at a
time when internal discord and external war threatened them, commenting that he
treated their perilous situation as a diminution of his own interests (τὴν καθ’ ἡμᾶς
196. SEG 29.1403, col. III, ll. 16–19; IGRR IV 293, col. II, ll. 5–6.
197. Aesch. Septem, ll. 14–20; Lycurgus In Leocratem 94–101; Plato Crito 51c8–52a3. Compare
Lycurgus fr. 110 for an actual reference to a θρέψαν ἐδάφος (in a mythical context).
198. For Classical antecedents, see Soph. Ant. ll. 189–90, as well as Aristotle.
199. IG II3 1 985. The near contemporary honorary decree for his brother Kallias (IG II3 1 911)
is comparable, although its rhetoric had to be tailored to the fact that Kallias was an émigré in the ser-
vice of a king, which ruled out some of the usual honorific topoi concerning citizens (Errington 2002:
26–27).
200. Compare Dreyer 2010: 353.
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περίστασιν ἴδι̣ον ἐλάσ̣σωμα̣ διαλαβὼν εἶναι).201 A fortiori, harm to a polis from
inside or outside was a threat to the personal security, interests, and flourishing
of any home citizen.
4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ETHICS OF LATER
HELLENISTIC DECREES AND ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
Although sections 2 and 3 have stressed the convergence between Hellenistic
decrees’ ethics and those of Aristotle and the Peripatetics, until this point I have tried
to remain neutral, except in a few cases, on the question whether any later Hellenistic
decree-drafters were actually exposed to the works of fourth-century intellectuals or to
Hellenistic works inspired by them. This section attempts a necessarily more specula-
tive task: it offers four hypothetical explanations for the overlap between the ethics of
fourth-century intellectuals, and their Hellenistic philosophical followers, and those of
relevant later Hellenistic decrees. These four explanations are not mutually exclusive.
Indeed, they were probably often each simultaneously relevant in particular cases.
First, the overlap was undoubtedly at least partly due in all cases to shared ethical
culture: both Aristotle, his fourth-century contemporaries, and the Peripatetics, on the
one hand, and later Hellenistic decree-drafters, on the other, took as their raw material
a widespread, fairly stable stock of “common-sense” ethical ideas. Both philosophers
and decree-drafters would have assimilated these “common-sense” views from a wide
range of sources: oral tradition, but also a wide range of literary genres, poetry as well
as prose. Viewed in this way, the ethical content of relevant later Hellenistic decrees,
more practical and demotic than the works of Aristotle and the Peripatetics, strongly
suggests that Aristotle and his followers were very successful in carrying out
Aristotle’s declared project of making respectable Greek ethical ideas the basis for
his own ethical philosophy.202
Nevertheless, even if the overlaps between Aristotelian philosophy and later
Hellenistic decrees partly involve a commitment to the polis and civic virtue very
widely shared among ancient Greeks, section 3 showed that the particular linguis-
tic and conceptual nuances put on that common Greek outlook in a significant
number of decrees were precisely those favored by fourth-century intellectuals,
especially Aristotle, and their Hellenistic followers. Relevant later Hellenistic
decree-drafters resembled some fourth-century figures who were not primarily
intellectuals, such as Demosthenes and Aeschines, in the way they idealized civic
virtue and civic relationships with elaborate rhetoric. However, they also articu-
lated more distinctively “philosophical” approaches to second-order, abstract ques-
tions about the how and why of civic virtue, with a coloring similar to Aristotle’s
and the Peripatetics’.
201. TAM III 7, ll. 10–11. For a parallel from the earlier Hellenistic period, see IG II3 1 871, ll.
18–21 (quoted in section 3a above).
202. Note Aristotle’s methodological reliance on endoxa (e.g., EN I.4–5).
222 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 37/No. 2/October 2018
Other factors than shared commonsensical assumptions were, therefore, probably
at work. A second hypothesis is that the overlap was partly due to the fact that
Aristotle and his followers and later Hellenistic decree-drafters were to some extent
engaged in similar projects: they each sought to articulate the ethical and psychologi-
cal foundations of the commonplace, longstanding assumptions underlying republican
civic life. Moreover, they each faced similar challenges. The fourth-century rise of
Macedon in Aristotle’s lifetime posed difficulties for civic autonomy and pride similar
to those posed by the spread of Roman hegemony. Similarly, the increased weight
which the civic honors system came to bear in Aristotle’s Athens (from the 340s
onwards)203 probably reflected similar financial shortages and civic tensions to those
which encouraged the distinctive rhetoric of relevant later Hellenistic decrees. From
this perspective, the overlap between Aristotle and relevant later Hellenistic decrees
emerges as a similarity in the responses of educated, property-owning Greeks, in
two distinct periods, to civic crises and doubts about the value of the polis.
The third possible hypothesis is that fourth-century ethical language and ideas,
especially Aristotle’s, did themselves indirectly influence relevant later Hellenistic
decree-drafters, as a result of a long period of diffusion. By the mid-to-late
Hellenistic period, Aristotelian language and ideas would have had sufficient time
to diffuse into popular culture, assisted by their continuing Peripatetic advocates: in
a possible parallel, it was arguably on the same timescale (one or two centuries) that
Kantian “human rights” or Utilitarian “prevention of suffering” became mainstream
moral concepts of crucial importance in political debates in Western European states.
In the Greek case, the genre of rhetoric probably played a crucial role in
enabling the percolation of philosophical ideas into everyday debates. For example,
Greek theoretical works on rhetoric, like Aristotle’s own Rhetoric, had to mediate
between abstract philosophical ethics and everyday ethical questions.204 Greek
biography probably played an equally important role: the Greek biographical genre
enabled, or required, the concrete application, in a vivid, accessible form, of abstract
ethical principles about the best way to lead a human life.205 Indeed, it may be
significant in this context that a major line of thought in modern scholarship on
Hellenistic biography attributes at least a loose Aristotelian or Peripatetic orientation
to it.206 The model of biography was probably particularly significant in the case of
the rhetoric of longer honorary decrees: as scholars have noted, long honorary
203. See, for example, Liddel 2007: 94–108, with earlier bibliography.
204. On Aristotle’s Rhetoric, see Irwin 1996.
205. See, for example, Momigliano 1971b: 9. On this point in relation to Plutarch, note Duff
1999.
206. Note especially the tradition deriving from Leo 1901 and Dihle 1956. Scholars sympathetic to
this view emphasize the role in the development of Hellenistic biography of the Peripatetics Theophrastus,
Aristoxenus, Hermippus, Antigonus (of Karystos), and Satyrus. As far as content is concerned, they
emphasize the way in which Plutarch’s biographies, thought to be inspired by Hellenistic models, focus
on the continuous development of a man’s ethical character from his earliest youth, through habituation
and moral choice (see the skeptical discussion in Momigliano 1971b: 9–15). Other scholars have strongly
questioned the contention that Hellenistic biography had a distinctively Peripatetic origin or orientation:
see Momigliano 1971a and Fortenbaugh 2007.
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decrees are themselves short biographies, which describe honorands’ lives and fit
them into an ethical template.207
Fourth, overlaps in language and ideas were probably sometimes due to direct
influence. That is to say, the ethical sensibilities of some later Hellenistic decree-
drafters were probably partly shaped by exposure to fourth-century ethical works
or to more recent philosophical works inspired by them, or to lectures based on
such works. According to this hypothesis, a similar process was at work in later
Hellenistic poleis to that which Allen has recently controversially identified in
Athens after c. 350: civic orators looked to philosophical works for inspiration.208
Allen’s arguments about fourth-century Athens mainly rely on evidence that partic-
ular words already common in philosophical texts (such as προαίρεσις) first feature
in Attic oratory after c. 350 BC. Although this article has occasionally addressed
the use of particular items of vocabulary (including προαίρεσις itself) in inscrip-
tions, the main focus has been on more substantial overlaps in ideas and rhetoric.
In some cases, as pointed out in section 3, the strength of a decree’s echoes of
a philosopher’s language or approach suggests that its drafter even wanted to
allude to a particular philosophical work or doctrine: the drafter of the Mylasan
decree for Iatrokles alluded to the unifying thesis of Plato’s Republic; the drafter
of the Prienian decree for Athenopolis alluded to a central thesis of Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics; the drafter of the Prienian decree for Moschion alluded to
a prominent argument of Aristotle’s Politics; and various decree-drafters alluded,
using Aristotelian or Peripatetic language and concepts, to Aristotle’s ideas about
polis-centered ethical education in virtue. In the light of these examples of proba-
ble direct allusion, the probability increases considerably that some of the weaker
echoes of philosophical works identified in section 3 were also the result of expo-
sure to philosophical works. That exposure could have loosely shaped those draf-
ters’ ethical sensibilities, or even provided a stock of rhetoric and ideas for them to
apply creatively in their honorific rhetoric.
It is not surprising that no decrees acknowledge or formally quote philosophers’
works: composing an honorary decree was not an exercise in literary, philosophical,
or antiquarian composition, but a practical exercise in praise and persuasion,
addressed to the whole civic population. Philosophical insights and doctrines thus
necessarily had to be introduced in an unobtrusive way. Nonetheless, some drafters
found means of indicating to educated, aware fellow citizens or outsiders that they
wished to make a philosophical allusion, or to indicate that their or the honorand’s
ethical sensibilities lay in one particular philosophical direction. For example, it is
striking how often the abstract or programmatic principles discussed in section 3
are introduced by using a participle of a verb of thinking or believing (for example,
νομίζων, διαλαβών, or ἡγούμενος) to attribute an ethical attitude to a citizen.
207. See Rosen 1987: esp. 284–87; Errington 2002: esp. 20–28. Hellenistic decrees’ links with
the genres of both rhetoric and biography are now studied in detail in Forster 2018.
208. See Allen 2006; 2010: esp. Part II.
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The wider historical context was ripe in the later Hellenistic period for exchange
between poleis and philosophers or philosophical works.209 On the polis side, the
public educational institutions of the polis, especially the gymnasium, became inte-
gral to civic identity in the course of the Hellenistic period,210 even if private educa-
tion also continued to play an important role.211 Moreover, it appears that
philosophy began to play an increasing role in civic education and civic life in gen-
eral in the second and first centuries.212 Most importantly, there are indications of
young citizens undertaking their own philosophical activities within polis gymnasia:
Melanion engaged in philosophical studies during his training in the Iasian gymna-
sium,213 while Polemaios “nourished his soul with learning” at Colophon, a phrase
strongly evocative of Hellenistic philosophical emphasis on “care of the soul” (com-
pare sections 3a and c above).214 At Athens, ephebic training came to include, in the
period after c. 122/1 BC, exposure to an eclectic philosophical curriculum.215 There
is not much evidence for the content of gymnasium libraries, which gained new
prominence and funding in the later Hellenistic period.216 A second-century BC
Rhodian list of books, which may record the contents of a gymnasium library,
includes a work on Athenian constitutional affairs by Demetrius of Phaleron.217
In the light of the evidence considered in this article, it may well not be coincidental
that Demetrius was a famous Peripatetic. The new prominence of philosophical edu-
cation in poleis partly explains the fact that the early first century BC saw some phi-
losophers take power in their poleis as “tyrants” sympathetic to King Mithridates’
revolt against Rome: the Peripatetic Athenion and the Epicurean Aristion in
Athens218 and the self-proclaimed Academic Diodorus in Adramyttion.219
There are also indications of connections in the later Hellenistic period between
poleis and foreign philosophers. As discussed in section 3c above, Polemaios of
Colophon had studied in the mid-second century BC at Rhodes, probably at least partly
at one of the famous philosophical schools there.220 Moreover, travelling intellectuals
gave lectures in poleis which were not major intellectual centers: Menas of Sestos
209. On the general history of the relationship between philosophy and the polis in the
Hellenistic period, see I. Hadot 2005; Erskine 1990; Scholz 1998; Haake 2007.
210. See Kah and Scholz 2004: e.g., P. Scholz’s introduction, 15, 22–24 (summarizing earlier
views); Haake 2007: e.g., 55.
211. See Scholz 2004: esp. 103–104.
212. Compare Dreyer 2004: 227–28 and 2010: 354; Haake 2007: 274–75, 281–82. For the view
that there was a general broadening of civic educational curricula, to include more intellectual and cul-
tural elements, in the period after c. 200 BC, see Scholz 2004: 110–11.
213. I.Iasos 98, ll. 15–16; cf. Scholz 2004: 113–14.
214. SEG 39.1243, col. I, ll. 3–4.
215. Burckhardt 2004: 203–204; Haake 2007: 44–55; Johnstone 2014: 355–56. An example is
IG II2 1006, ll. 19–20.
216. See Scholz 2004: 125–8; Johnstone 2014: 370–1.
217. Maiuri 1925: no. 11. On euergetical donations of books in second-century BC Rhodes, and
the involvement of the gymnasiarch: Johnstone 2014: 355, 369.
218. Habicht 1997: 300–305.
219. Str. 13.1.66.
220. SEG 39.1243, col. I, ll. 22–24; compare Haake 2007: 226.
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had arranged for “educated men” to give lectures in the gymnasium of Sestos.221
These travelling intellectuals included Peripatetic philosophers. For example, in the
early Hellenistic period, Clearchus of Soli was famously active at Ai Khanoum.222
Around 200 BC, Epikrates of Herakleia was honored by the Samians for his services
to the polis, including his free tuition of those unable to pay fees, in an inscription
which explicitly identified him as a Peripatetic.223
The Samians’ praise for Epikrates heralds a new tendency after c. 200 BC for
poleis to praise philosophers specifically for their philosophical teaching and prac-
tice.224 Citizens may have become even more amenable to such rhetoric in the course
of the second century. Haake identifies a contrast, suggestive of such a development,
between decrees for philosophers from Larissa, dating to c. 170/69 and 130/29 BC
respectively. The earlier two decrees (of c. 170/69 BC), for a certain Satyros of
Athens, merely identify him as a sympathetic philosopher. By contrast, the later decree
(of c. 130/29 BC) explicitly praises a certain Alexander of Athens for responding
favorably to a request from gymnasiarchs to come to Larissa to teach in the gymna-
sium and for behaving in a way “appropriate to philosophy” (φιλοσοφίας οἰκείαν)
while in Larissa, attending to the welfare of the neoi.225
As far as the world of high philosophy is concerned, recent studies have revealed
the dynamism and complexity of philosophical debate in the later Hellenistic
world.226 There were some moves towards eclecticism and synthesis,227 but also con-
tinuing sharp divisions between (and within) schools, often based on mutual counter-
definition. In the debates about ethical philosophy of this period, it is very likely that
there was a “practical turn”: a renewed interest in philosophical answers to day-to-day
problems of how to live and govern. This may well have reflected and encouraged
exchanges between poleis and philosophers.228 The “practical turn” was probably
most starkly reflected in later Hellenistic Stoicism, especially the works of
Panaetius229 and Posidonius: in the second- and first-century BC Stoa there was prob-
ably a shift—of emphasis rather than doctrine—towards more interest in the morally
imperfect “ordinary man,” rather than the virtuous sage.230 As Wiemer has recently
221. I.Sestos 1, ll. 74–6; cf. Scholz 2004: 118–20.
222. See Robert 1968: 416–57.
223. IG XII 6 1 128; cf. Scholz 2004: 119–20; Haake 2007: 185–90.
224. Haake 2009: 54–55. Diogenes Laertius records an honorary decree of the Athenians for
the Stoic founder Zeno of Kition from the earlier Hellenistic period (D.L. 7.10–12; Habicht 1997:
156–57). The preserved text includes praise of Zeno’s philosophical activities, but Haake (2007:
124–25) thinks this was due to later elaboration of the text.
225. Haake 2010: 45–46; see the text (p. 40), ll. 12–17.
226. See Sedley 2012; Schofield 2013; Engberg-Pedersen 2017.
227. Compare Pohlenz 1984: 248–56; Annas 1995. Note, for example, the synthesizing activity
of Antiochus of Ascalon, studied in the papers in Sedley 2012.
228. Compare Dreyer 2010: 352–53.
229. Cic. Fin. 4.23; Sen. Ep. 116.5; Griffin and Atkins 1991: xx; Long and Sedley 1987:
vol. 1, 427.
230. Long and Sedley 1987: vol. 1, 427.
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shown, this development in Stoicism included intensified engagement with the pro-
blems and everyday debates of Greek cities, reflected in their epigraphy.231
In addition, Aristotelianism, which had always had a practical focus in ethics,
may have been undergoing a renaissance in philosophy.232 For example, Panaetius
himself was said by Cicero to have given more attention than earlier Stoics to the
ideas of both Plato and Aristotle.233 An anecdote in Strabo gives the impression that
Aristotle’s works were lost for most of the Hellenistic period, until discovered in a
hole in Skepsis in the first century BC. This anecdote, heavy in cultural symbolism,
is difficult to trust;234 it is likely that the exoteric, and perhaps also esoteric, works of
Aristotle remained quite widely available.235 In any case, whatever the fate of
Aristotle’s written works, Hellenistic philosophers had sustained Aristotelian ideas
in the interim, through both written and oral contributions to debates, and continued
to engage with them in the first centuries BC and AD. Those responsible included
not only Stoics,236 but also neo-Pythagoreans.237 However, the most important
defenders and promoters of Aristotelian thinking were, inevitably, the Peripatetics
themselves. The Peripatetics may even have gained in prominence in the later
Hellenistic period: the second-century BC Peripatetic Critolaus was very successful
in developing a significant public and political profile for himself and for the
Peripatos.238 Interestingly for the argument of this paper, the Peripatos’ public pro-
file was probably based to a significant extent on Peripatetics’ active involvement in
rhetorical and philosophical teaching in poleis (compare Epikrates of Herakleia at
Samos, mentioned above): Cicero regarded the Peripatetics as leaders in first-
century BC rhetorical education.239
The rivalry and mutual influence of the Stoics and Peripatetics seem to have
played an important role in later Hellenistic and early Imperial ethical discourse.240
As I explore in another article, that rivalry was probably also entwined with more
practical political debates about democracy, property, and power in the first centuries
231. Wiemer 2016.
232. On renewed philosophical interest in Plato and Aristotle in the later Hellenistic world:
Schofield 2013.
233. Cic. Fin. 4.79.
234. Johnstone 2014: 375–79. Barnes 1997 suggests that the anecdote may refer only to
Aristotle’s own personal copies of his books.
235. Compare Moraux 1973–2001: vol. 1, 10–11.
236. See above, on Panaetius.
237. Thesleff (1961: 55) argues that neo-Pythagorean authors of pseudepigraphical works pur-
porting to be works of famous Classical Pythagoreans overlaid Academic ideas with Peripatetic color-
ing (these were probably works of the Hellenistic and early Imperial periods; compare Centrone
2014). For relevant examples, see Thesleff 1965: 8–11, 40–41 (sections of texts purporting to be by
Archytas).
238. See Hahm 2007; Inwood 2014: ch. 3; also Haake 2007: 255–59 (on honors for Critolaus at
Olympia).
239. Cic. De Or. 1.43, 3.57–76, esp. 62; Brut. 119–20; Tusc. 2.9, with Griffin 1997: 9–10; Wiater
2011: 33–40.
240. Compare Cic. Off. 1.2, 6; also Inwood 2014: 89–90 (on Seneca’s intellectual environment,
and his opposition to the Peripatetics).
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of Roman control over the Greek world.241 These Stoic-Peripatetic debates were
probably prominent in the higher education and wider public sphere in which
the citizens involved in drafting decrees participated, not least as a result of the
work of Peripatetic teachers. The pro-Aristotelian instincts, preferences, and
beliefs aroused in some citizens by those debates probably then colored citizens’
rhetoric when they set out visions of the good man and the good citizen in honor-
ary decrees.
5. CONCLUSION
Even in the later Hellenistic period, polis citizens were capable of a relatively
sophisticated, idealistic articulation of fairly traditional civic republican ethics.
Moreover, that articulation was in important respects comparable in subtlety with
the complex, distinctive rhetoric and argumentation of Aristotle and his Peripatetic
successors. By contrast, later Hellenistic citizens were strikingly oblivious or resis-
tant to the rival political ethics of the Stoics, let alone the anti-politics of the
Epicureans or Cynics or the skeptical accommodation to existing society of the
New Academy. For example, no Stoic could have given a positive, active role in vir-
tuous activity, comparable with that of reason, to emotion (pathos); identified public-
spirited civic activity as a good man’s defining attribute; given an intrinsic role to
bodily and external goods, including personal wealth, in the good life; or argued that
the polis is the indispensable context for the acquisition and exercise of virtue.
Even if Stoicism was a leading philosophical approach and source of ethical
legitimacy and comfort in Hellenistic monarchical courts and among itinerant
Hellenistic intellectuals, civic decrees suggest that Stoicism and the underlying
assumptions about the soul and the universe which it articulated did not monopolize
thinking in poleis. Indeed, the content of later Hellenistic decrees can partly be inter-
preted as a reaction against tendencies in Hellenistic ethical and political thinking to
some extent crystallized, as well as significantly adapted, by the Stoics: in particular,
against any tendency to focus on the rational self and to weaken its interdependence
with the material world, the physical polis, and fellow citizens.
This conclusion can contribute to ongoing reassessment of the fate of
Aristotelian and Aristotelian-style thought in the Hellenistic period. Recent work,
mentioned in section 4, has shown that Peripatetic philosophy remained vibrant into
the later Hellenistic period and beyond, retaining a strong interest in the central role
of the polis in the virtuous life, even while engaging with Stoic cosmopolitanism and
universalism.242 The evidence of honorary decrees shows that, in parallel with this
rich Peripatetic activity, citizens still engaged in running poleis in the later
Hellenistic period remained committed to a set of ideals very close to those which
241. Gray 2018.
242. See, for example, Hahm 2007; Sharples 2010; Inwood 2014; these works partially modify
the picture of Annas 1995.
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animate Aristotle’s ethical and political works, at the same time as they too made
accommodations with a more cosmopolitan world. As argued in section 4, it is quite
likely that these two developments influenced each other.
It was far from coincidental that it was an Aristotelian-style defense of the polis,
with all relevant psychological and ethical foundations, that gained a grip on the
imagination of many Hellenistic citizens, especially in the later Hellenistic period.
Later Hellenistic poleis had to deal with external challenges to their autonomy or
even existence, as well as internal shortages, inequalities, and conflicts. In response,
later Hellenistic citizens looked for comfort, legitimation, and inspiration to a set of
ideals that made key to true individual fulfillment a lifestyle which only citizenship
in a polis could offer: the life of energetic civic virtue and continuous, lifelong,
collaborative ethical development. This was a lifestyle which always aimed at an
Aristotelian “mean” between extremes: a harmonious balance of emotion and rea-
son, of worldly and spiritual goods, of utilitarian and cultural pursuits, of individu-
alism and sociability, and of self-assertion and self-denial.
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